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This thesis examines the relationship between the USSR
and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen from a systemic
aspect; the intent, to gauge the potential for the South
Yemenis to undertake specific tactical operations in a
Soviet-surrogate manner. This work analyzes the Soviet-
Yemeni military export relationship. In making this assess-
ment, the internal political dynamics with the effects of a
colonial legacy and a repressive imamate-turned-republic in
South and North Yemen respectively have been explored; the
results of these predicated the Soviet involvement. This
effort includes an assessment of Sino-Soviet competition
there. Additionally, the United States' counter-commitment
and arms transfers to the YAR (with the deployment of a naval
carrier task force to the Arabian Sea in light of the March
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The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PRDY) and
the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) together (South and North
Yemen respectively) , form a theatre of engagement between
two rival ideologies. It is to South Yemen, the Marxist
regime of Aden, that the Soviet Union has devoted massive
amounts of economic and military aid, equipment, advisors,
and technicians. In a similar manner, the United States has
effected selected arms transfers to North Yemen. To demon-
strate this commitment and underscore the US interest, in
March of 19 79, the Carter administration dispatched USS
CONSTELLATION to the area; the intention, a "global signal."
The underpinning of this situation remains the fact that due
to the conflicting strategic, economic, and ideological goals
of the USSR and the US that are at stake, both have the
potential to be drawn into a crisis, with them, the super-
powers, assuming the major roles.
The strategies and tactics that the US and the USSR are
using have familiar themes: the US goal of maintaining the
credibility of its client (in this case North Yemen) and the
USSR providing fraternal assistance—through a surrogage
force—to a liberation front (South Yemen) . Indeed, the
tone may sound analogous to US-Vietnamese and US-Iranian
relations, but in this case, unlike Vietnam, the potential
for rapid escalation and involvement is unusually great.
The reason is that a vital national interest of both

superpowers is involved: oil. Neither the YAR nor the PDRY
is petroleum-rich; however, their strategic proximity to the
vast reserves in the region upgrades these two nations as
critical actors in the overall strategic calculus (ultimately
the Arabian Peninsula, the Red Sea Basin, the Horn of Africa,
and the Persian Gulf) . In fact, recent events make this point
all the more important given Soviet setbacks in Afghanistan
(the Karmal regime requiring increased Soviet security assis-
tance to establish its legitimacy) and in the province of
Eritrea Ethiopia (where Eritrean guerillas are combatting
Soviet-backed Ethiopian troops and are having successful
results)
.
The significance of the recent conflict between North
and South Yemen is unquestionable and justifies an accurate
assessment of the present situation. This thesis will examine
the geopolitical/strategic significance of the two nations,
their internal political dynamics, and the relationships
that exist with the superpowers, Washington-Sanaa and
Moscow-Aden. Included in this analysis are these primary
variables/components: the strategic locale, the political
instability, and the increasing military exports. Addition-
ally, this effort will attempt to establish the link between
Soviet activities in Aden and on the Horn of Africa. This
assessment will hopefully generate hypotheses which may be
applicable to other cases.
The following hypothesis will be tested: "Soviet support
of the PDRY is a phase of a long range, calculated strategy

to groom allies and potential surrogates in the region in
order to undertake specific military, tactical operations;
US support of the YAR represents a desire to maintain area
stability and counter Soviet advances."
In the process of testing this hypothesis, it would be
most helpful, if one had access to the Soviet (and PDRY)
decision-making process information. By examining the com-
ponents of the governmental machinery inside the "black boxes"
this task would be infinitely more simple. As this is not the
case, a more pragmatic tack must be employed, i.e., one of
output analysis. In this regard, it is necessary to con-
struct a framework which defines the components and parameters
of the system; (see figs. 1 and 2). The arguments will be
developed largely in a chronological sequence. Chapter II,
"Arabia Felix—Arabia Divisus , " will focus on the significant
political developments in the Yemens , emphasizing the 1839-
1979 period. This will establish the great power interests,
and the colonial legacy, scrutinizing the Yemeni methods of
dealing with these. Against this background grew the Soviet
involvement, as examined in Chapter III, "The Soviet Presence."
This section discusses the Yemeni-Soviet military relationship
and the potential for Soviet employment of the South Yemenis
in a surrogate manner. One of the nuances of the Yemeni
national development is a formula for competition between the
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, covered in
Chapter IV, "Sino-Soviet ' One-Upsmanship ' . " As the Soviet
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relationship has developed. Chapter V, "The US in the YAR,"
will examine this connection, particularly the range of US-
Saudi responses to the threat from the South. The conclusion
will focus on the prospects for a unified Yemen and formulate
other hypotheses for the Soviet-YAR/PDRY future.
A systemic "conceptual lens" will be employed for pur-
poses of this examination to view the events and the actions
among players. The dependent variables in this instance are
the commitments by the US and the USSR; these are in turn
affected by national interests, coupled with political and
economic goals and objectives. The military exports that
have been arranged between sponsor and client represent a
key portion of this estimation. These indicators will be
used to gauge the degree of support provided, allowing con-
clusions to be drawn about future involvement by the super-
powers, particularly in response to crises developing between





II. ARABIA FELIX — ARABIA DIVISUS
SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
(1839-1979)
"I have lived my faith and my love
as an internationalist, my direction
and my way are Arab,
The beat of my heart will remain Yemeni,
The universe will never see a guard over
my land."
Yemeni popular song
Fragmentation and dynamic interactions tend to charac-
terize Arab political history and the two Yemens are no
exception. The intent of this section is not to recount
the political chronology and goings-on in South Arabia;
rather to take a somewhat disinterested look at the more
historically significant developments will better integrate
the actors and their actions into a systemic perspective.
Power politics, as practiced by Great Britain, the
Ottomans, the Soviet Union, et al, have shaped the history
of the two Yemens. This analysis will attempt to gauge the
results of Ottoman evacuation from Yemen (then replaced by
a series of repressive imams) and the similar British egress
from Aden Protectorate, with particular attention paid to
how these created a vacuum only to be respectively filled by
a republic and one of the most radical Marxist regimes extant,
The resulting understanding of the effects of the Zaydi rule
from Sanaa and the colonial legacy in Aden are essential to




The histories of Aden, the Hadramaut (the Eastern portion
of Yemen from Aden) and Yemen are all largely intertwined and
any historical analysis, no matter how cursory, must take this
into account. In pre-Islamic times, the area that encompasses
both present-day states (North and South Yemen) was called
Arabia Felix, Happy or prosperous Arabia, by the foreigners
envious of such riches as frankincense, myrrh, pearls, silks,
and spices that seemed to pour forth from its lands; even
then, its history contained the conflict theme of tribes
constantly battling for supremacy. This, the age of
Ignorance (the Islamic concept: Jahiliya) , ended in the
seventh century with the introduction of Islam into this
area; however, what survived from this previous epoch were
many of the factions and allegiances, some although religious
in nature, were later transformed into viable political
forces. There were large pockets of Jews, Christians,
Zoroastrians, et als, still flourishing in the Yemen each
with definite political goals. When coupled with the
traditional bedouin cleavages and with Islamic expansion
factored in, the result was the potential for serious
instabilities. The situation was only exacerbated as a
result of the events surrounding the death of Ali and the
establishment of the Umayyad Caliphate. What resulted was
the significant Shi'a (the Partisans of Ali) - Sunni (the
Muawiyah supporters) schism which is to date reflected in
the Yemens (and would contribute to a chronic state of
2




During the ninth century, the East African coast became
a collection point for members of the Zaydi sect of Islam.
(Its people are followers of Zayd, grandson of al-Husayn,
who was killed about 740 in an uprising against the Umayyads.)
Though an offshoot of the Shi* a, the Zaydis do not emphasize
Shi'ite tenents and come close to being Sunnites. As a
result of the effects of the geographic closeness, Yemen's
political history was altered:
The year 893 A.D. witnessed a significant
event in the history of Yemen. During
that year, A-Hadi Yahya Ibn Hussein-El-Haq,
a first descendant of the Caliph Ali, founded
the Rassite dynasty which based its rule
on the Zaydi sect of Islam. Since then,
the system of government in Yemen has been
basically dependent upon the teachings of
the Quran. Accordingly, . . . the Imam
should observe the principles of justice
and equity.
The rule of the Imams, and for the most part under the
Rassid dynasty, was virtually unchallenged from this point
until the fifteenth century. It was then, that Portuguese
explorers developed designs on Aden (one of the earliest
hints of its strategic locale's importance) although these
were unsuccessful for the most part. With the Ottoman
desire for expansion (c. 1520) and subsequent defeat of the
Mamlukes in Egypt, came efforts to consolidate their gain
and deny the Portuguese entrance to the Red Sea. Later,
Ottoman campaigns in Yemen and attempts to impose Sunni
Islam on the populace were answered with very stiff
resistance from the Yemenites. The Arabs of Yemen did not
acquiesce in the Turkish occupation of a part of their
16

country, and several revolts ensued: the rebellions of
1547-51 and 1556-70 were indications of the Yemenites
determination to free their country. Thus, it has been
correctly stated that the Ottoman "hold on Yemen proved
to be precarious .
"
Out of the Turko-Yemeni conflict came a truce which
allowed for the Imam to retain provincial control and
Turkish management of foreign affairs; what followed during
the first year of the truce (1609) was the initial British
visit to the area: a ship of the British East India company
called at both Mocha and Aden to explore commercial
possibilities. This incident marked both the increased
flow of British merchant traffic to these cities and
commerce. Congruently, the Ottoman evacuation (in 16 36)
as a result of the successful resistance movement marked the
beginning of the Rassid dynasty, the independent succession
of Lahej and fragmentation of politico-religious allegiances.
This division was only made worse by the Imam entering into
a very comfortable and profitable economic arrangement with
the British and Dutch. At this point, European influence in
Yemen (Aden and the Hadramaut) was firmly entrenched as
evidenced by a munition works in Sanaa, and a naval hospital
erected at Mocha. It was not until 1798 that this influence
was tested, when the French ousted the Mamlukes and
threatened to move into Aden; the British countered this
move by themselves establishing a formal presence there.
17

B. THE BRITISH PRESENCE
A not so surprising sequence of events surrounded the
British occupation of Aden, based on three components: coal,
politics, and seapower (rewording the modern combination Oil
,
Politics
, and Seapower , Adie) . The commercial ties that
Great Britain developed with India were essential to the
growth of the empire and any threat to these communication/
economic links by a regional power was clearly intolerable.
Being a fore-runner in the use of steam navigation, Britain
was forced to rely on certain strategically situated coaling
stations along her trade routes. In order to secure these
stations for British use, it was necessary to conclude
treaties with the indigenous occupants. The first such
in Aden was "signed on 6 September, 180 2 providing for a
'commercial union' between the East India Company and the
Sultan of Aden: "opening the port for British goods,
charging only miniscule duties, and no charge for anchoring
or customhouse, and moreover, 'granting lavish extra-
q
territorial privileges and immunities to British subjects."
Finally, the French-Egyptian campaign had to be checked, as
did Russian ventures into the Mediterranean. Egyptian
operations in Arabia had disturbed the British who judged
that preponderant influence of a single strong power in the
Red Sea as well as the Persian Gulf represented an unacceptable
9threat to their communications with India. Evidently, the
thinking in London was in favor of a military action to
eliminate this threat, which is precisely what followed:
an exercise of British seapower.
18

The convenient justification for Britain's intervention
came when in 1837, the Indian vessel "Deria Dowlut" (which,
by the way, was under British colors) shipwrecked off the
Aden coast and was subsequently plundered. (Accounts
differ regarding the details, but most place the onus on
"irresponsible Adenese," acting without the Sultan's
sanction). Captain S. B. Haines, Royal Indian Navy,
acting with the authority of the government commenced an
investigation of the occurrence and generated talks
concerning the purchase of Aden. For nearly two years,
this process continued as did negotiations over the Sultan's
jurisdiction. At one point, when the agreement seemed about
to be realized, the Sultan wrote to Haines in Bombay: "Let
the body be burnt, but do not let the native country be
pierced, it is better to sell ones mother than do this."
With the principle of the negotiations violated, Aden
was captured by force in 1839. Henceforth, British efforts
to ensure a stable hinterland for this foothold on the
Peninsula by cultivating relations with the rulers of the
inland principalities constituted a challenge to both the
12
Yemeni state and the Ottoman government.
From the outset, British involvement in Aden has been
described (for the most part by British historians) as
limited to those measures necessary to protect their base;
the security of the outpost rather than the hinterland was
in the scope of British design:
19

There was no need to conquer the hinterland
to make Aden safe. The deep belt of indepen-
dent Shafi'i tribes formed a cordon sanitaire
and although Haines at first had difficulty
with his immediate neighbors and former ruler
of Aden, the Sultan of Lahej, their leaders
were brought into a special relationship with
British Aden. ^3
(Although technically, the Central Government of Yemen was
the Imam of Sanaa, the actual authority that he carried to
Aden and the other coastal regions is difficult to gauge.
As has been mentioned, the Zaydi Imam was of the Shi'ite
sect; the tribes surrounding this area were Shafi'is:
Sunnis; in nearly constant conflict. Ergo: the degree of
authority that the Sultan enjoyed as well as a responsibility
to Sanaa is unclear. This factor is of prime importance in




Perhaps the best amplification of this "special
relationship" lies in the points of this "bond" (as the
14
treaties have been labeled) extended to some sixteen tribes.
Though somehwat less than specific, the general salience of
the treaty, or agreement, may be described in these four
points:
1. The British Government undertakes to extend
to the chief's territory and its dependencies
the gracious favor and protection of His
Majesty, the King-Emperor.
2. The Chief agrees and promises on behalf of
himself, his heirs and successors and the
whole of his tribe under his jurisdiction,
to refrain from entering into any correspondence,
agreement, or treaty with any foreign nation or
power and further promises to give immediate
notice to the Resident at Aden, or other
British Officer, of the attempt by any other





3. The chief binds himself, his heirs and
successors forever that they will not cede,
sell, mortgage, lease, hire or give, or
otherwise dispose of his territory under his
jurisdiction or any part of the same, at any
time, to any power other than the British
Government.
4. In consideration thereof, the British
Government agrees to pay the said chief and
his successors or successor a specified sum
of Maria Theresa dollars—every month—on
condition that the chief would keep open the
roads in his country and under his authority
and jurisdiction, and that he would protect
all persons who may be going in the direction
of Aden for the purposes of trade, or
returning therefrom. 1 ^
This special relationship has also been translated as
having brought the Yemeni tribes "('in friendly relations')
and their country under the British sphere of influence.
Between a sphere of influence and a protectorate there was
only a step and between the evolution of a British protec-
torate and involvement there was only another: in time both
16
were taken" (although the manner and circumstances unique)
.
Of course the question arises "why did the British
agents and the members of local tribes enter into these
negotiated agreements?" The answer is not exactly clear-cut,
but depending on ones' perspective can be explained. It
should be noted that South Arabia was still under Ottoman
"tactical command" (i.e. save Aden) throughout the nineteenth
century, although there was much indigenous open resistance
to the occupation. The Turkish presence continued to bring
tribes to Aden eager to make alliances of some sort with the
17
British; when one compares the results of a British
"protectorate" treaty to the imposition of Ottoman adminis-
tration and all that entailed (witness the chaos resulting
21

from the Sublime Porte's representatives Ahmad Mukktan
Pasha and Ahmad Feizi Pasha) the British desires to acquire
"friendly relations" appear quite noble. If any tangible
benefit can be derived from this harsh rule by the Ottomans
it was the unintentional support that the Imam enjoyed. It
was on the opposition to Ottoman rule that most factions of
Yemeni society could unite: a new line of Qasimi Imams,
the Hamid Al-Din became after 1879 credible leaders of a
national liberation movement; mobilization of wealth and
18
manpower dramatically enhanced.
C. CHALLENGE TO THE TURKISH RULE
After the turn of the century Imam Al-Mutawakkil Yahya
emerged as a national hero and there was wide-scale support
for his advocacy of military actions against the Turks. This
revolt was so forceful and drastic that all Turkish garrisons
19
were subdued and surrendered. (Their actual defensive
readiness is in question, though according to Stookey,
p. 160.) The short range benefits of the victory began to
dissipate as the traditional contentions began to emerge:
rival claims to the Imamate; conflict between the Shafii
and Zaydi; and negotiations with the hated Turks. As the
negotiations were drawn out and these conflicts intensified,
Yahya 's support was being sapped and the way was being paved
for a long-standing joint British-Ottoman objective: clear
demarcations of respective spheres of influence. The Ango-
Turkish Commission produced the end result responsible for
22

this "blue and violet deliniation"
,
(the present YAR-PDRY
border) the Treaty of Du'an (Daan) and was ratified by the
Sublime Porte in 1913.
(Between Jan. 1903 and May 1905, the frontier line was
drawn from Perim, a point at the extreme southwest corner
of Arabian Peninsula, to a point as far northeast as the
Bana river, leaving the town of Dhala on the British side
and Qa'taba on the Turkish side of the line. Beyond the
Bana, the line was not delimited. Thus, in theory, Southern
Arabia was divided into spheres of Ottoman and British
influence; in fact, neither had much control beyond the
garrison posts and the tribes under their immediate control.")
This event signified abandonment of the unifying principle;
for the Imam, it was a blow politically—resigning that
office to the status of leader of the Zaydi community rather
21than of a Yemeni nation.
Above all, it must be emphasized that these frontiers
were deliniated by two occupying powers, without legal/
sovereign sanction, for the purpose of military and
strategic gain; largely without real consideration for
the long-term effects on the indigenous population.
Certainly it would be an incorrect assertion to portent
that any nation (such as Yemen) which had both Turkish and
British soldiers in-country during the outbreak of
international conflict (WWI) would remain unscathed.
However, due to its alignment in the war, Yemen did fare
rather well: other than skirmishes centering around Aden
23

and Hodeida, the nation was very little affected (i.e. no
wide-scale destruction as in Europe) . During this war, the
Yemeni were to remain nominally loyal to the Turks, "notwith-
standing their hatred of them, the British aided the Idrisi
Arabs to capture Asir (in the North) and in 1917, the British
22took Hodeida, which they ceded to the Idrisi in 1921,"
later, this area was to be annexed by Yemen. Throughout
this time, the British continued to acquire territory: the
Lighthouse Islands and Kamran Island (in addition to Perim
Island) in keeping with their original desires to maintain
a secure coaling station. The acid test of Britain's
security forces occurred during this time and the credibility
of the protectorate doctrine was jeopardized: "a protectorate
where there was no British presence and was protected only by
a British scarecrow in Aden was a bluff and could only survive
23
until the bluff was called." The Ottomans called that bluff
during the war; Imam Yahya also called it after the War.
Trevaskis mentions that "the significance . . . was lost
during the immense commotion of global warfare." Perhaps
this was true in a relative, or comparative sense only,
especially for Britain, but to the Imam, the tribal chieftains,
et als., the significance of the "protector unable to
protect" was far from lost.
An important outcome of World War I was the erosion of
the Ottoman empire and for Yemen and the Aden protectorate
particularly, the Mudros Armistice , which (although the Imam
was not a signatory) marked the Turkish exit from Yemen and
24

left Imam Yahya as sovereign of the independent nation.
This exit was survived, though by several important facets
of the Ottoman legacy: 'the Turkish movement toward
administrative modernization, Westernization and concepts
of government; . . . attempts at organization of an infra-
structure, replete with communications systems, social and
medical facilities; and the idea of a professional army and
militia under the command of a corps of officers whose status
24
and role were fully differentiated. ' It is this latter
point that has current relevance because the Yemeni military,
largely under instruction of Turkish expatriates, has
transformed as a medium for social and political change.
Unfortunately, Imam Yahya' s good intentions were later
partially responsible for his downfall. By sponsoring the
education of his officer cadre in Iraq, Syria, and later
Egypt, the seeds of revolution were in effect implanted in
his country. When analyzed in conjunction with his pre-
occupation with his succession and desire to carry out a
Jihad against the British, it is evident that the imamate's
legitimacy began to fade.
This was indeed unfortunate, for Yahya 's were the first
real attempts at transcending the problems inherent in the
traditional popular groupings and organize these under a
workable form of government, albeit, a kingdom. In fact,
Yahya' s own son, Ahmad, was to admit: ". . .he succeeded
in unifying Yemen under his absolute authority; this was an
enormous accomplishment (given) the rise of no less than a
25

25hundred amirates, shaikhdoms, and sultantates . " A brief
analysis of the components of Yemeni society will provide
a degree of explanation:
(a) Conflict was endemic to Yemeni society; as has been
mentioned there was a history of struggle between the warring
tribes and social groupings. This may be explained partially
(not written off, though) as a result of environmental
phenomena leading to determinism; i.e., given the rough
geography and terrain (a good number of Yemenis were mountain
people) a degree of "rugged individualism: and independence
resulted. Factored in with a suspicion of outsiders,
Islamic precepts and fundamentalism ingrained into the
adherents, the conflict theme was logically exacerbated
vis-a-vis relations with foreigners. The very pinnacle of
government, the imamate, was no exception, particularly, in
his relations with the British in Aden; he focused on that
external threat.
(b) There were a number of differing perceptions of the role
of government in society. It was the notion of many segments
that providing for the security of the trade routes, tax
collection, etc. , was the responsibility of the central
government; public administration, adjudication, and other
functions were to be carried out by the local ulama, thereby
decentralizing control.
(c) The Imam's relationship with his subjects helped to
alienate his strongest power base, and those who saw him
into office, the ulama. Of particular importance was the
26

Zaydi ularaa, who centered in the urban areas, held numerous
positions and effectively formed the intelligentsia. The
Shaf i ' i counterpart was also present, although these were
subordinate to the Zaydis (i.e. excluded from government/
administrative posts)
.
(d) Industrial labor, in the modern sense, appeared only
toward the close of Ahmad* s reign. There were unskilled
wage-earners; stevedores in the port towns, and tanners,
oil-pressers, potters, spinners and weavers, etc. These
laborers were not totally dependent upon wages for their
livelihood; "they brought with them the political ties and
26
orientations from their villages."
(e) Communication, education, medical facilities, etc. were
definitely lacking or in undeveloped stages; there was no
complete feedback system to the office of the imam,
especially when criticism was involved; these conditions
grew progressively worse under Yahya's successor.
In sum, "disintegration of the authority pattern was
a sympton of decline of the regime's legitimacy among the
peasants, from whom its resources were mainly derived;
among the bourgeoise, upon whom it depended for technical
functions, but whom it excluded from a voice in policy;
among the sayyid aristocracy; finally; Imam Ahmad fatally
weakened the moral basis of his rule in the eyes of Zaidi
27
tribes, which were its ultimate mainstay."
Such was the scenario: an independent kingdom in Yemen
created, almost by default in essence, by the Turkish
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evacuation; Aden Protectorate established along with the
adjacent Eastern Protectorate, under British suzerainty.
Yemen, when compared to Aden, was much more advanced: the
standard of living much higher; a sense of order and
organization (though containing the highlighted drawbacks)
;
and developing a sense of common orientation. Conversely,
Aden and Hadramaut presented a somewhat different picture.
Legally and technically, there was only one protectorate;
however, the terms Eastern (the Hadramaut) and Western
(including Aden) were applied to facilitate administration.
The first concern of the British was to bring order to the
2 8Western protectorate because of its proximity to Aden,
but this was attempted with no real concern for modernization
or advancement. Two sources were employed to meet this end:
the internal security forces, and air power. The Tribal
guards and the Government guards and later the Aden
Protectorate Levies all drew from the surrounding tribes
for their regulars with British and Arab officers filling
the necessary posts. The establishment of these forces
allowed Britain's planners to turn their attentions to
establishing and developing the Royal Air Force (RAF) base
at Aden. For communications, security, and an upper hand
in conflict, the RAF spoke for itself, proven in combat
with Yahya's forces and holding any ideas of Italian
expansion at bay. The RAF was able to impose its rough
and ready peace very rapidly, as the Imam of Yemen
29discovered almost at once.
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Next in order of British priorities was to establish
some sense of order in the Eastern protectorate, the most
populous and economically beneficial region. This was no
simple undertaking; in 19 33, the major effort commenced,
and it was calculated that some two thousand separate
governments existed in this region: Great Britain recognized
but two. The socio-religious complexion of this area
was extremely diverse and commonalities other than the
bedouin attributes were all but nonexistent, unlike in
Yemen. The old British colonial tactic of imposing 'indirect
rule' was chosen to achieve this goal, modified as primarily
an advisory post.
If one man can be identified as important in this
capacity, it would be Harold Ingrams, "the first resident
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advisor to the Eastern protectorate." Ingrams laboriously
waged a peace initiative among the tribes in effort to
establish a workable truce that would be satisfactory for
both. His efforts were hampered though, due to an extremely
small, literate labor force. Perhaps the most successful
of his ventures was establishment of the Hadrami Bedouin
legion and the Aden Protectorate College for Sons of Chiefs;
these were attempts to fulfill the needs of developing an
infrastructure and providing for a means of internal
security by intertwining the attributes of a police,




The only drawback of " Ingrams ' Peace" was that it was
antithetical to the tribal system that continually replaced,
by election, weak or ineffective rulers. By signing the
agreements, the British effectively froze those rulers then
in power—and their heirs— which was the principal cause
for the discontent that would find an effective outlet in
32the nationalistic organizations forming in Aden Colony.
D. THE REVOLUTION OF 196 2
Yemen's transformation from an independent Zaydi imamate
into a republic was a long process with two important power
struggles occurring prior to the 196 2 Revolution. The
al-Wazir coup of 1948 and the abortive attempt in 1955 were
attempts to "effect changes in the personnel ruling Yemen
and to revise priorities among received political values
without destroying the bases of existing political order.
(In contrast) the leaders of the 1962 revolt were revolu-
tionaries in that they aspired to a significant reorganization
of Yemeni society, to the assertion of aims innovative in
Yemeni politics and to a permanent shift in the locus of
33legitimate authority." In 1948, al-Wazir, along with
members of the Free Yemeni Party and various other
conspirators attempted to install al-Wazir in the imam's
office. The resulting assassination of Yahya only alienated
the majority of the tribesmen and too: "it became rapidly
apparent, that once Imam Yahya was removed, no common goals
34
united the conspirators." The inability to reach a
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consensus caused the coup to fail. Similar conditions
existed in 1955 although the details were less carefully
planned. Additionally, the conspirators, including members
of the ulama and army general staff were unable to muster
mass participation; there was no effort to rally popular
support beyond demanding the obedience of the citizenry.
A republic, in Middle East usage, is a
state with a non-dynastic head. The
term has no reference to the process
by which the head attains his office,
nor to the manner in which he discharges
it. Republicanism meant the end of
monarchy, and much of it— though not
all— that was connected with it. It
had nothing to do with representative
government, or liberal democracy. °
It was the development of a republic that the loose
coalition of army officers, Shafi'is, young intellectuals,
laborers and dissidents who authored the revolution were
working to achieve. The military officers as a group were
a key factor in bringing the revolution to fruition. For
these, the Egyptians (in Yemen on liaison and vice versa)
served as mentors, particularly given the Egyptian masses*
support to Nasir. One can imagine the Anti-Ahmad sentiment
upon his terminating the concept of the United Arab States
and speaking out with rhetoric in the "Nasir v. Islam vein."
The Shafi'i merchants were an important element in the
planning, contribution of funds, and arranging the smuggling
37
and stockpiling of arms and ammunition. As they were
reinvesting huge sums into Yemen's economy and were being
deprived of many of the benefits of their wealth, this
sector of the population had a vested interest. Finally,
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the intelligentsia formed a diverse group with equally
diverse interests; although these were effectively mobilized
into a bloc of support.
If one fundamental reason for the revolution can be
identified, it would be the rising unmet expectations
resulting from external contact. Between 1955 and 1962,
these politically changed Yemenis became convinced that their
progress could be protected and further advances made, only
if the monarchy were done away with; moreover, they were
convinced that by their own efforts they could bring this
about. These were and generally are, the necessary conditions
38for a revolution. (Long before the appearance of the
republican regime, Cairo had served as a haven for political
refugees from the Yemen, as well as from many other Arab
lands; the Free Yemeni movement enjoyed the blessings of
Abd al-Nasir's government. Whether or not advance joint
planning between the UAR and Yemeni conspirators actually
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took place was not publicly disclosed.)
The development of the Yemen republic was done at
Ahmad 1 s expense for as opposition to his rule grew, he
became less just and more brutal. Imam Badr succeeded his
father in October, 1961 (a gross violation of a principal
Islamic tenent) and proved to be incapable of establishing
effective control over the rapidly developing situation.
Although Badr had attended school in Egypt and espoused a
foreign policy all-too-familiar to that of Nasir's own,
factionalism within his government was so pervasive and
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the revolutionary movement so great that change was inevitable.
A tactical alliance between Zaydi officers and the Shafi'i
merchants made it certain.
Badr was left with a divided nation; his
pro-Egyptian policies had lost him the
support of tribal leaders without gaining
him the support of the radicals who despised
the Mutawakilite dynasty. On 26 September,
1962, eighteen days after Ahmad' s death, one
of the radicals, Col. Abdullah al Sallal,
whom Ahmad had kept chained to a wall for
several years until his rescue by Badr, led
the army and six tanks against Al Bashayn
Palace and shelled it thoroughly. He
occupied the palace and declared Badr's
death. Sallal proceeded to execute members
of the royal family and Badr's friends who
had not escaped and proclaimed himself
leader of the revolution with the title
of Prime Minister. **0
(See Fig. 3 for factions among the participants.)
And so, the revolution began which marked the inception
of the succession from monarchy; logically, a long civil
war broke out and served as a forum to settle the dispute.
It is at this point that the histories of both the
newborn Yemen republic and that of the Aden Protectorate
markedly changed due to the interferences of foreign
governments, Saudi Arabia, Britain, the United States
and the United Arab Republic (Egypt) particularly. (The
Soviet Union also played a definite role in this scenario;
however, this will be dealt with at a later point in
Chapter III, "The Soviet Presence.") This may be explained
by the various interests each had at stake in the area;
e.g.: Britain had a long-standing commitment in Aden
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Fig. 3 FACTIONS and PARTICIPANTS in the 1962 REVOLUTION*
Right wing The Zaidi tribes, both those such as the
Khawlan which drifted in and out of the
republican orbit during the civil war,
and those which consistently supported
the YAR against the royalists such as
some Hashid tribes.
The moderate reformers—Nu'man, Zubairi,
Iryani, etc., —with considerable influ-
ence in the urban centers as well as
in the countryside.
The large Shafi'i merchants, aspiring
to an effective voice in government
decisions in the interest of security,
freedom, and commerce.
Nasserists, whether by conviction or by
opportunism during the Egyptian presence;
prominent in, but not confined to, the
Yemeni officers.
Ba'athists, numerous, young officers and
civilian intellectuals.
Communists; among the Soviet-trained
armed forces, civilians educated in
USSR & E. Europe. Also among
detribalized repatriates.
Left wing
National Liberation Front (NLF) ; the
radical revolutionary movement which
succeeded to British rule in S. Yemen
and established the PDRY; considerable
influence among laborers returning from
Yemen, and some adherents in the armed
forces.
Source, Stookey, Yemen, p. 237.
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and feared the cross-border flow effects; Saudi Arabia's
own internal security may have been effected should
there be inaction by the House of Saud. It was Egypt,
though, with the greatest potential gain by providing
support to Yemen; Nasir could once again assert his
"unquestioned" leadership role among the Arab nations
by modernizing—clearing the established monarchies
from the path of nationalism
—
perhaps gain back prestige
41long lost (in relations with Syria and Iraq specifically)
.
Hence, the situation was multi-tiered: the attentions
of the world's major powers had been captured, each
one aligning itself with the respective faction that
it favored. (As for Britain and the US: Britain
refused to recognize the republicans and the US did
so in December 196 2, providing that Egypt reduce its
presence there.)
The protracted and to some degree inconclusive
civil war which resulted from the revolution was to
last over the course of the next five years, with
42bloody military campaigns ravaging the Yemen. The
eventual outcomes were nonetheless significant as
derived results (all "combat tested") explain:
(a) The Egyptian commitment to the republican (Sallal)
regime) government may be measured in terms of the
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military support and equipment provided. The actual
numbers vary, but most sources will agree that President
Abd al-Nasir committed in excess of 60,000 troops at one
point (one estimate claims 85,000+); regardless, the
military support to Yemen was tremendous to the point
of Egyptian regulars actually conducting operations,
(judging by the operational reports this may have been
the safest course of action, as the Egyptians were just
as likely to be shot by republicans as royalists.) The
new republican army as distinct from the tribal levies,
was slow in building, and as late as the spring of 1967,
still numbered fewer than 10,000, three-fourths of them
trained in Egypt. In the circumstances, Egypt had to
assume nearly full responsibility for the major campaigns.
Evidently, with such great benefits to be realized from
his association with the Yemen clients, Nasir made the
decision for full commitment; to have a complete and total
victory over the royalists and thereby effectively establish
a true hegemony over the Yemenis. Nasir made his first
visit to Yemen in April, 1964, and drew up a new constitution
with a President, prime minister, consultative and defense
councils, judiciary, and municipality groups. Sallal was
sent on trips to Cairo, Moscow, and Peiking to gain time
44for the new institutions to consolidate. The direction
in which the Yemen republic was to be steered was most clear.
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(The Egyptian commitment worked as a double-edged sword;
for although it did demonstrate Nasir's resolve, his desire
to gain leverage over the Yemenis through assistance merely
exacerbated the traditional Yemen resentment of foreigners.)
(b) Through the Egyptian association , the way was essentially
paved for direct Soviet and other communist support.
Signals for help were being sent to the socialist countries
and the Egyptian inability to reach a decisive victory over
the royalist (and "imperialist-backed") forces provided the
justification (i.e., the link to Soviet prestige also being
put to the test via Nasir was implicit) . Following the UAR
withdrawal from Yemen, this would be particularly emphasized.
(c) The civil war tested the administrative and governing
abilities of the republicans and simultaneously challenged
their nation-building skills. The republican coup was rife
with factionalism and could not seem to reach a common
ground. Of these, the most important division was between
the 'pro-Egypt' and 'progressive' groups. The transition
from a military to civilian government was made, but then
reverted to the military; the civilian experiment deemed a
failure by Egypt. The in-fighting that was rampant within
the republican ranks merely reinforced the socio-political
divisions— Zaydi-Shafi ' i--proving the highest levels of
government were not exempt from this legacy. On occasion, the
by-product of this conflict proved to be the 'habitual
45




(d) Relations between the royal houses of Saud and Hamid al-Din
had never been particularly close; they were divided on the
grounds of religious sectarianism and territorial disputes
46had been responsible for a full-scale war in 1933-34. Their
differences notwithstanding, the Saudis did provide support
to the royalists (due to a "repugnance for the overthrow of
kings."), both militarily and financially. The Saudi desire
to see an end to the conflict and UAR forces out of the
Arabian Peninsula was responsible for the Saudi-sponsored
cease-fire talks (Jidda, Harad, etc.). Finally, at the Arab
League Summit, (the post-196 7 Arab-Israeli War Arab League
Summit Meeting) , the UAR withdrew.
The summiteers also created a mission
consisting of Iraq, Morocco, and Sudan
to mediate the dispute over Yemen between
the UAR and Saudi Arabia. Such was the
price that Abd al-Nasir had to pay for
Saudi participation in the consortium
of the oil-rich members of the Arab
League which helped Egypt and Jordan
balance their budgets after the defeat
-r 47in June. *
'
The moderating force by the Saudis in the interest of
intra-Arab conflict resolution was established and would
emerge many more times in future instances.
1. Revolution in Yemen , Fallout in Aden
It must be re-emphasized that the histories of Yemen
and Aden were very much inter-connected; the events
surrounding the Yemen Revolution on the Aden side of the
border bear this out. In and around Aden, the vestiges of
British rule and imperialism/colonialism were obvious everywhere.
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Moreover, the epitome of this concept—British India—was
thoroughly reflected in Aden society. Until Aden reached
colonial status, it was administered as part of India and
due to the communications/trade link with India, there were
an abundance of Indian-nationals present. These enjoyed a
relatively high status in the social structure (second only
to British) and were employed in the government administration
extensively; the typical British colonial tactic of indirect
rule.
As Aden grew in population, industrial complexity and
economic importance, so grew the political awareness of the
indigenous population. Although there was little organized
political opinion that was (recognizably) hostile to the
48British until the Mid-1950* s, the social and working
conditions certainly bred that hostility. Voice in government
and administration was for the most part non-existent to the
average Adenese citizen. The first identifiable organization
that would provide a means of conveying popular demands was
the Aden Association. This group was a collective of merchant-
men who campaigned for more power in the administration and
49
recognition of foreign nationals as citizens. Almost
simultaneously, two anti-British Arab groups formed: the
United National Front and the South Arabia League; the
former demanding Britain's exit and the union among the
Peninsular states (save Saudi Arabia) ; the latter, a desire




The events of 1952-53, the Egyptian coup d'etat and
revolution, had a dramatic and long-lasting effect throughout
the Arab world in general, and Aden Colony, particularly.
This produced Shockwaves of Arab nationalism throughout the
Middle East which served to encourage the anti-British/
nationalist sentiments. With Nasir's demand that the British
evacuate the Suez Canal Zone and his initiation of relations
with the USSR, the concept of socialism in an Arab sense was
born; furthermore, it appeared as a viable alternative to
British domination. In Aden, the tempo of Free Yemeni
activities increased; their actions took the form of propaganda
campaigns, formation of the Trade Union Congress (responsible
for a number of strikes which became increasingly more
violent) and general calls for independence.
This violently developing situation did not go un-
noticed by the British, for at this point, the decision was
made to grant South Arabia a degree of autonomy. Six states
of the Arabian Peninsula formed the Arab emirates of the
South, only later to be renamed the Federation of South
Arabia. The primordial ties and allegiances of the bedouin
society were quite strong and even a loose amalgamation of
these was difficult to achieve. Efforts to bring Aden into
this association were undertaken in 1963; "Simultaneously,
a National Liberation Front (NLF) motivated by socialist
ideology was established in Aden, dedicated from its
inception to armed rebellion against the British and their
'lackeys' (the ruling class).
40

To say the least, there were fundamentals present
for sustained conflict; the ingredients were there and the
conditions right. The ordinary citizen of Aden feared that
any form of association with the protectorate states would
make him subject to the 'feudal' sheikhs who would be
supported by the British and able to enforce their rule by
a well-equipped and trained army formed of their tribesmen
—
for that in effect was how he viewed the transfer of levies
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and guards to the federation. The NLF general command was
able to muster enough popular support to synthesize the
efforts of sporadic tribal conflict into an effective
campaign and ultimately a war of national liberation. The
support received from Egypt and the newly-formed Yemeni
republic caused this rebellion to spread into all of the
British protectorates, in spite of efforts by the South
Arabian federal government to halt it.
The goals of self-determination and suffrage were
nearly unobtainable due to the degree of repression the
popular movement received under the British. Arrests,
detentions, even tortures were the means used to stop the
liberation movement. In fact, at one point, Britain
suspended the constitution and briefly substituted a direct
rule policy. Perhaps the key to eventual freedom--due
largely to the inability of the British to quash the move-
ments—was the formation of a "tactical marriage" of
numerous groups; e.g.: the Organization for the Liberation
of the Occupied South (OLOS) together with the NLF created
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the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY) ; a more
militant cadre formed under the Popular Organization of
Revolutionary Forces (PORF) et als. Terrorist activities
and incredible violence were rampant at this time: the
federation was decaying; the British had decided to leave
the area in 1966, effective 1968 and desired some semblance
of order prior to leaving. Amidst these events and somewhat
ahead of schedule, the British handed over the government of
South Arabia to the NLF and on 30 November, 19 6 7 an
independent unitary state was proclaimed under the name of
52
the Peoples Republic of South Yemen (PRSY)
.
Eager to welcome the new-born nation into the Marxist-
Socialist camp, the USSR made recognition of this republic,
developing a rapport that exists even today, with inter-
mittent punctuation by the Peoples Republic of China.
E. THE PDRY & YAR: THE INDEPENDENT AND POST-REVOLUTION
DECADE
1. The Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen
The PDRY recently marked its twelfth anniversary of
independence and end of British colonial rule. Over the
course of the past twelve years, a major transformation has
occurred— the internal political structure has developed a
true Marxist orientation through an effective, but not always
peaceful process. When the NLF came to power in 196 7, it
inherited from British colonialism an extreme case of divided
economy; in Aden, home for 250,000 people, there was a service-
53based economy tied to the international shipping trade.
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The pervading sense of anti-colonialism coupled with NLF
aims for immediate transformation resulted in factional
power struggles and national chaos. During the pre-
independence struggles, many of the citizens best suited
for positions in the government (i.e., those with adminis-
trative skills) were killed, or immigrated and consequently,
present government functionaries were trained abroad. In
essence, the NLF was faced with a grass-roots organizational
process.
"In October, 1978, after a fifteen year process, the
NLF became the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) . This process
involved a "double radicalization: " in the first phase,
from its establishment in October, 1963-June, 1969, it was
radicalized within the parameters of the Arab nationalist
movement; the Marxist-Leninist faction came indisputably to
54power in June, 1969." The second phase began in 1972 with
the establishment of a Central Committee, followed by a
Politburo (incorporating the Ba'athist and communist groups"),
an ideological school in Aden, a huge trade union; addition-
ally, "student and young pioneer-type groups" were formed.




modelled on the Cuban system, were set up in the urban areas,
but this project is believed to have not been successful:
popular enthusiasm was low and the security functions of the
55
committee came to predominate. Throughout this phase, the
components were assembled to formulate a cohesive sense of
national-direction that would be received with eventual
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popular support. Free elections conducted nation-wide,
including women voting, worked together to increase the
legitimacy of the regime. The similarity between the
political organization and other nations (e.g.: USSR,
Angola, Mozambique, Cuba, etc.) is not coincidental. •
2. The Yemen Arab Republic
The YAR of the post-revolution and civil war days
has itself undergone significant political change. Following
the Egyptian exit (and with them went a good deal of
military hardware) in 1967, the civil war reached a stalemate
with waning royalist pressure finally ceasing. A blood-
less coup replaced Sallal and a republican governing council
was instated, to prohibit a dictatorship from ever attaining
power. Furthermore, a constitution was established:
The Yemeni Constitution, placed in effect
on 28 December, 19 70 patently embodied the
thinking of the older generation of Free
Yemenis. It sought to establish political
procedures that would respect and preserve
the hold of Islam over the great majority
of the population while erecting effective
barriers to autocracy. It declares Yemen
to be an Islamic as well as Arab nation,
and the Shari'a to be the source of all
its laws. ... a bill of rights implies
that the state treats with each citizen
as an individual. ... the national goals
are modest, conservative and mainly
instrumental: unity, social and economic
development. ^6
Unfortunately, these rather ideal goals were short-
lived (1974) as was the constitution, for a number of reasons,
not the least of which was subversion from the PDRY and the
two nations' inability to reach a common ground. The
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constitution and Consultative council were suspended, with
a junta taking charge. Fortunately, it was restored.
At this point, the Republican Government is headed
by a seven-member Command council: it is the council that
functions as the policymaking body and appoints a Prime
Minister, who functions essentially as an administrative
official; the cabinet, appointed by the Prime Minister,
57
varies in size (both responsible to the Command Council)
.
Despite the seemingly grandiose goals, the Yemeni factionalism
has not been overcome and was partially responsible for the
5 8
events of June, 19 78.
Presently, the National Democratic Front (NDF) is
enjoying a growing popularity, forming a collective for
anti-Sanaa sentiments. Charging North Yemen with incredible
repression of its citizens, the Aden-headquartered NDF is
provoking destabilizing actions aimed at the YAR. (Unhappy
with the pro-West/Saudi stance Sanaa has adopted, the NDF is
demanding: "revival of the long-neglected investigation
into the assassination of Ibrahim al-Hamdi; renunciation of
the policy of "exclusive alliance" with Saudi Arabia, and
59
resumption of talks with South Yemen.)
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Fig. 4 Shifts of Power in the Yemens
SOUTHERN YEMEN: *The Sultantates of the Federation of South
Arabia were overthrown by the NLF in Nov.
1967; the rulers were deposed or fled.
The successors:
Qahtan al-Shaabi; 30 Nov., 1967-22 June,
1969; resigned; later, placed under
detention by the new three-man council,
where he remains today.
Salem Rubae Ali ; 22 June, 1969-26 June,
1978: executed after military coup.
Abdul Fatah Ismail; 26 June, 1978-Present.
YEMEN: Imam Ahmad; 14 March, 1948-18 Sept., 1962;
died of chronic ailments and old wounds.
His successors:
Col. Abdullah al-Salal; 28 Sept., 1962-
5 Nov., 1967 deposed in a military coup led
by dissident republicans released from
detention in Egypt.
Abdul Rahman al-Iryani; 5 Nov., 1967-13 June,
1974: deposed in a bloodless coup, then
deported to Syria.
Col. Ibrahim al-Hamdi; 13 June, 1974-10 Oct.,
19 77; killed when his car was machine-
gunned.
Ahmed al-Ghasmi; 10 Oct., 1977-24 June, 1978;
killed when a bomb contained in a briefcase
carried by a visiting diplomat from S. Yemen
exploded.
Major Abdallal Saleh; 24 June, 19 78-Present.
* Source: New York Times, 2 July, 19 78
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3. June , 19 78 : A Crucial Time for the Two Yemens
June, 19 78 was a tumultous month for both the YAR
and the PDRY. Two violent events, an assassination and a
coup d'etat focused the attentions of the world on these
two countries once again.
The first act in the new violence that
embroiled the area was the assassination
of North Yemen's President al-Gashmi by
a bomb planted in the briefcase of an
envoy from Pres. Salim Robae Ali of
South Yemen. The murder was blamed on
President Ali and was cited as a factor
in his overthrow and execution two days
later by colleagues in South Yemen's
pro-Soviet National Front. 60
These two tragic events stemmed from problems that
Ali was having internally
—
problems of nation-building
(i.e., economic, social, etc.) in his attempts to set a
course for the PDRY. 'Salem Robae Ali ' s death marked,
above all, the violent denoument of that second, post 1969
radicalization through which the ill-defined leftism of the
late 1960 's was further transformed and given institutional
form. With him fell not only a group opposed to the trend
of this second radicalism, but also the main exponents of
an alternative and less orthodox pattern of development.
Criticism of Ali began approximately a year previous
to the coup; he was attacked for his administrative
abilities, "undermining relations with the USSR," and
(perhaps) leaning too close to the Saudi camp. The




He seemed to have realized by June 19 78
that the only way out of his increasingly
restricted position in the South was to
provoke a crisis in which he could re-
establish his own authority by receiving
support from sympathetic nationalistic
forces in the North, i.e. forces hostile
to al-Ghashmi, but also independent of
the NLF organization in the South. ...
The evidence tends to confirm, though not
prove, the impression that it was indeed
the Southern President who in an act of
desperation, precipitated the crisis.
The Central Committee went into an emergency session
after the assassination; two days later, Ali and two other
cohorts were executed. The present Abdul Fatah Ismail &
Ali Nasser Mohammed regime took up the reins of South Yemeni
government. In the North, Major Abdallal Saleh did likewise
and became president.
The first identifiable conflictual fall-out from the
Iranian revolution was the February-March 19 79 war between
the Yemens. It was the Soviet-sponsored security assistance
to PDRY that predicated the border warfare; consequently,
the US rushed arms and technicians to the North.) Though
only sporadic conflict occurred, this short campaign tested
the resolve of the superpowers in support of their
respective allies.
The flurry of Arab League activity which
led to the surprising turn of the tide
in the Southwestern tip of the Arabian
Peninsula during the month of March seemed
to be very promising indeed. As a result
of a rather rare combination of interests
on the part of a number of Arab states
—
all desirous of a cessation of hostilities
between the two Yemens— the two parties
had at first reached an agreement on a
number of crucial points. ... When the
leaders of the two Yemens met in Kuwait
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for three days late in March, their
deliberations produced an agreement
on no less than the establishment of
a union between their two states.
The agreement stipulated a union would
be set up within a year following
elaborate preparations . °^
The prospects of a unified Yemen are questionable
as unification would translate to a hegemony in effect,
i.e. either PDRY over YAR or vice versa. Successful
unification would mean removal of the factionalism that
is so much a part of the political reality of both nations.
If history serves as any judge of this possibility, then
history speaks for itself.
F. A COLONIAL LEGACY AND THE FORCE OF ISLAM: TWO CROSS-
CUTTING FACTORS
The histories of the two Yemen have been marred by
violent conflict from the outset. From the earliest
points in the history of this region external powers have
been either directly or indirectly involved in the functions
j
of government which in turn has directly effected its
citizens. The great powers of the world have had strategic/
economic designs on the Yemens and in the process of ful-
filling these, have attempted various models of political
and colonial administration, many times with no regard for
the indigenous population, their religion, mores, or values.
The undesirable side-effects—violence and political
instability—are readily apparent now. Furthermore, these
have developed deep cleavages among the members of both




Equally unfortunate is the likelihood of a cessation of
super power interests/involvement/intervention. Even now
(as will be demonstrated in the following chapters) the
Soviet Union is working for a union between YAR and PDRY;
the impetus is not altruism, rather to reap tangible
benefits of the strategic, economic, and political sort.
The Soviet investment in armaments in PDRY is staggering
and leads many analysts to conclude that their motives are
concerned with developing a surrogate force in the South
Yemenis: "Cubans of the Middle East." And just how could
this be possible? The answer lies somewhere in the sage of
Aden's development. "The revolution of the PDRY since
independence illustrates, in an extreme form, the fate of
revolutions in this century. It has taken place in an
extremely impoverished country where, precisely because of
the weakness of the local ruling class and the intense
impact of British colonialism, it was more possible for a
movement that was both nationalist and socially revolutionary
to come to power. (as in Cuba, Vietnam, and Angola, the
Soviet assistance to a new and struggling regime has been
6 ft
of immense significance.")
Behind the scenes of the power politics played out by
the superpowers lies the backdrop of Islam. A combination
of the reaction to great power presence and the tremendous
potential force of this value system are volatile ingredients
for revolution in the Yemens . For instance, "The revolution
in Iran is pushing the West to do what it should have done
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long ago— to pay sensitive attention to Islam. Unfamiliarity
with a religion seen as exotic and irrelevant has figured in
what has turned out to be inadequate reporting, mistaken
6 7interpretation of events and undiplomatic diplomacy." As
the apparent revival of Islam is occurring throughout much
of the world, it would indeed behoove the adherents of other
faiths to try to comprehend the striving of millions of
fellow human beings. A British correspondent reports on
one encounter with a Pakistani mullah:
You in the West have an understandably
hostile attitude to Islamic revival.
... You see it as a backward step, a
process of uncivilizing a country, of
brutalizing it with a code of conduct
that is applicable only to a primitive
desert people. We look upon it as a
divinely directed form of socialism.
We create in an Islamic society a
system in which there is no need to
steal or kill— respect ... is born
out of the equality that Islam dictates.
You do not focus on (the fact) that
Islam is an ideal non-Communist social
system for the poor masses. 6 8
As to what place in the international political system
this nascent force demands:
Islam, we are all beginning to realize
only now, is the coming political force
in the Third World— a religion, a sense
of discipline that dominates a third of
the world's people from the African
Atlantic coast to the Java Sea. We have
to reckon with it precisely as we have to
reckon with the other global ideologies,
and to do so involves understanding,




III. THE SOVIET PRESENCE
The Soviet experiment in Yemen is indicative of certain
generalities which pertain to their Middle East strategy.
Therefore, one may conclude that this was a seemingly
logical progression. Recognizing (a) the importance of the
region in general, (b) this importance in terms of the Soviet
perception (both historically and presently) , and (c) the
potential benefits associated with a presence there, the
development of their Yemeni policy comes as so surprise.
This analysis will proceed from these assumption.
A. ADEN & SANAA: MOSCOW'S LINK WITH THE HORN
There is not a shade of doubt that the
present events in the Horn of Africa
are directly due to the collusion of
the imperialist powers, primarily the
US with reactionary Arab regimes. This
pursues the purpose of dealing a blow
at the progressive forces in the Red
Sea Basin. It is not for nothing that
the Horn has been assigned an exception-
ally important place . . . ; the presence
of top class ports in the Gulf of Aden
and in the Indian Ocean, and what is
most important, the fact that SLOCS link
the oil-producing countries in the region
with the US. (Tass Dateline.) 1
The strategic importance of the Arabian Peninsula, by
virtue of its geographic location cannot be over-emphasized.
Bordering on three continents and containing essential
waterways both natural and man-made, this has historically
been an area of vital interest for the great powers of the
world and has become more valuable, as technology,
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communications and weapons systems have evolved; this
strategic potential has long been recognized by the Soviet
Union, too. A presence here would mean a shortened line of
communication between Moscow and forces in the area; a
solution to numerous logistical problems; and an opportunity
to locally base naval forces— a goal that is still extremely
high on the Soviet global priority list. Hence, the obvious
attractiveness of Aden coupled with Hodeida and the network
of nearby islands, as a potential Soviet-regarded linchpin
for coordination of regional operations.
The importance of the Middle East is one of the common-
places of writings on international politics, a function of
2
oil, strategy and regional stability. This importance was
not lost on Moscow's strategic planners at all:
Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean (and
the Middle East) is an extension of an old
Czarist thrust for an outlet to the South,
dating from the time of Peter the Great.
That interest is overlaid with the ideo-
logical desire for a worldwide Soviet
hegemony. Increasing Soviet military
power and decline of the European powers impel
the present Soviet drives to replace Britain
as the dominant power in the littoral states
. . . Soviet dominance seems both to protect
its own interests in the area and to threaten
the vital oil supplies of Europe and the
United States. 3
Most Sovietologists and Kremlinologists will attest to the
veracity of this statement's theme; however, with the
emergence of Arab nationalism and the desire on the parts
of many area regimes to become independent actors, Arabo-
logists would be inclined to add certain caveats. For
example, the Soviet desires notwithstanding, relations
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with the USSR provided a vehicle for national development.
A significant facet of this process included "modernizing"
the military forces for the struggle against Israel. (By
no means should the USSR's involvement be misread as taking
precedence over the wave of nationalism; for although the
Russian assistance was needed, even the radical regimes at
the time did not particularly desire to be placed in great
dependency.) Regardless, since 1955, the USSR has made some
very important advances, as well as suffered major setbacks
in this region.
It has been asserted that because of three basic factors,
the Soviet Union was able to make certain significant
advances:
(1) Circumstances in the Middle East itself were more
favorable for Soviet penetration, (e.g.: emergence of
Arab revolutionary regimes)
;
(2) Western policies in the Middle East were uneven,
inconsistent, hesitating, contradictory, etc.;
(3) Soviet policies themselves were flexible and skillfully
geared to maximize advantages derived from local circumstances
and Western errors. Soviet policies here fused two elements:
4Soviet national interests and Communist ideological concepts.
These three factors work together to explain what
appeared to be a general receptivity to Soviet involvement
in the Arab world on behalf of these developing nations.
Moreover, they also serve as indicators of the resulting
Soviet foreign policy quests. Perhaps the single-most
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successful means of attaining these foreign policy goals was
through the arms transfer process. There were definite Arab
security needs to be filled and the Soviet Union was more than
willing to undertake this task. (The US proved to be in a
dilemma due to the commitment to Israel.) Syria, Iraq,
North Yemen, and (the UAR) later Egypt all received Soviet
armaments and are by now familiar sagas in meeting their
perceived security needs. Of further significance are the
benefits the Soviets reaped: the enhanced prestige and
economic plussage (i.e., the hard-currency exchange) —both
in the Soviet national interest—and the successful test-
case for the USSR to effect arms transfers (ideologically
sanctioned and in keeping with the "fraternal assistance"
and "wars of national liberation" commitments). Thus, the
challenge to the West and the effect on the regional balance
of power had been accomplished.
Although a complete understanding of the motives behind
this involvement is constrained by lack of access to the
appropriate Soviet sources, certain assumptions may be made
given the historical indicators that are available for
examination. That the Soviet Union has had a lengthy
involvement in this region is evident by naval deployments
and expeditions commissioned under Tsarist regimes. Later,
Stalin had ambitions in this area as borne out in the 19 40
Four Power Pact, which more than provided for Soviet-Nazi
non-aggression, in effect targeted Soviet interests "South
of the national territory of the Soviet Union, in the
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direction of the Indian Ocean" (or as the Soviet counter-
draft referred " . . .in the direction of the Persian Gulf)
.
In 19 78, several significant events occurred in this region
that further develop the case for the Russian involvement:
Soviet security assistance to Ethiopia (in the war in Ogaden)
;
a coup d'etat in Afghanistan which installed a pro-Soviet
regime (i.e., that of Nur Muhammad Taraki) ; and the assassin-
ation in North Yemen followed by the coup d'etat in South
Yemen; the after-shocks of these and other events are still
being felt.
The theory of Soviet behavior as determined by a "grand
design" is founded upon the notion that foreign policy is
evolutionary and historical. This theory, in its absolute
sense, identifies Moscow as employing strategy and tactics to
promote Soviet communism, eroding Western and Chinese
presence, and using this region as a springboard for later
g
achievements. By establishing a series of regional pro-
Soviet regimes, certain advantages are gained for Moscow.
(This concept may be contrasted to the "muddled theory" that
argues Soviet exploitation of selected targets of opportunity.)
From all available indicators, it is apparent that the
"grand design" rationale most probably impels Soviet regional
policy. Consider this sequence of events:
They set out to establish footholds in
the Indian Ocean in a fashion remniscent
of nineteenth century Great Britain:
first came the fleet, then the flag, the
merchant marine, the traders, the (now
secular Marxist) missionary, the political,
military, and technical advisors. To
consolidate this hold, economic assistance




The Soviet track record in the Middle East has shown
certain negative results, too, particularly when considering
the ousting of their advisors from Egypt and severing of
diplomatic relations. The "Ugly Russian" syndrome seemed to
predominate relations in the post-1973 War timeframe, due to
a number of factors, not the least of which was the Soviet
desire to pursue short term benefits resulting from their
tactical pursuit of targets of opportunity (for indeed at
times they have done just that) . However, to deny the exist-
ence of the long range strategy involved would be to under-
estimate the Soviet planners. For example, the Soviets have
demonstrated a longstanding interest in Africa, since
Khrushchev's time: recent activities on the Horn bear this
out. "From a global, strategic viewpoint, the Horn of Africa
has become, during 1978, an integral part of a Soviet design
for the entire region: Afghanistan, Iran, PDRY, Northern
Chad, the Sahara—all seem to fit a "pattern." The Horn is
perceived today as an important new Soviet foothold, even
though the French remain in Djibouti, a US fleet remains in
the Indian Ocean and the Soviets have established a foothold
in Somalia—now forsaken for Ethiopia— a decade ago." In
fact, a recent treaty concluded with the Mengistu regime
points to the increased joint Ethiopian-USSR collaboration.
"Increased military cooperation, multilateral resistance to
aggression, etc.;" although somewhat typical of the Soviet
style, the nuances and implications for the Soviets are
definitely beneficial, (e.g.: "the provisions lend
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legitimization to existing USSR aid to Ethiopia as well as
for future Soviet activities . . . ; interpreted by the USSR
as justification for demanding base rights on the Eritrean
Red Sea coast; lead to further Ethiopian involvement as a
base for subversion or as a proxy force in regional strategic
12projects). Through their exports of military aid and by
generating the psychological support for the radical Mengistu
regime, the USSR may now also be trying to cultivate this
same type of relationship with the PDRY; ergo: the identi-
fiable linkage between Soviet efforts on the Horn and in
South Yemen.
The course of analysis will now focus on the origin of
Soviet peninsular interests, the campaign in Yemen. In this
regard, Soviet activity here, when viewed as a component in
a larger system may be seen not as one unique case study,
rather as a logical follow-on to previous and future objectives.
B. SOVIET ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE YEMEN
Although Imam al-Mutawakkil Yahya did sign a treaty of
friendship with the USSR in 1928, thus marking the initial
Soviet overture to Yemen, this relationship did not fully
develop until the reaffirmation of that treaty in 1955.
(It was during that year that the Soviets intensified their
Middle East policy.)
Over the next few years, this relationship grew both in
commitment and complexity: Yemen received increasing amounts
of Soviet hardware; simultaneously, Yemeni-UAR relations
were approaching a new dimension. A brief examination of
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the supply and demand rationales of the Soviet Union and the
Yemen is necessary to comprehend the parameters of this
affiliation (as these have relevance to the current PDRY-USSR
commitment)
.
1. Soviet Supply v. Yemeni Demand Rationale
There are certain factors, when considered together,
that serve as a motivating force for the Soviets to become
involved with a repressive imamate such as Ahmad' s, (a
gamble with his government from the outset) , which include:
(a) The realization of geo-strategic gain. Establishing a
presence in Yemen would (when combined with the presence in
Egypt) effectively anchor both entrances to the Red Sea—via
Suez and through the Arabian Sea. A physical closeness to the
petroleum supplies and transportation routes would also be
established. Additionally, a presence in Yemen would facil-
itate logistic support of African recipients, in keeping with
those strategic interests.
(b) The chance to counter/challenge Western advances. The
USSR regarded the area as a sphere of Western influence
14
which the Western powers had no intention of leaving.
By harnessing and eventually exploiting the surfacing anti-
British sentiments, the Soviets would logically gain in this
competition. An ideal means for ideological advancement
might be provided through the Yemeni anti-imperialism/





(c) The support for the United Arab Republic (Egypt) . By
maintaining the existing support for the UAR, encouraging
UAR-Yemeni ties, and providing direct support to Yemen, the
USSR would establish itself as a credible supplier which was
true to its clients. Hence, the obvious benefits from
association with the Soviet Union would be recognized by
Yemen and the other Arab states. ("The shipments of arms
to Yemen undoubtedly increased the Russian prestige in the
eyes of the Yemeni government; however, there was an uncom-
fortable aspect for the Yemenis, for unless Russian or
Russian-sponsored mercenaries could have been employed to
operate the weapons, they would have had little or no effect
when used, and unless used at that time, would quickly have
become unserviceable." Here lies the implicit importance
of Egyptian operators and technicians.)
The collective motivation from these and other
factors provided the necessary justification for the
inclusion of Yemen among Soviet foreign policy targets in
the Middle East. Thus, by heralding the Yemeni struggle
against imperialism/colonialism, the Soviets were able to
attain their own goals indirectly, through the Yemenis.
Just as the Soviet Union had a component justification
for its involvement, so the Yemen had a number of demands
that could be met through an association with the Russians:
the resultant of the interaction of these two concepts




(a) The desire to end colonial oppression. Historically,
Yemen had been under Ottoman suzerainty; Aden and the Pro-
tectorate— to which the imam had territorial claim—was
under British rule. The desires of Yahya and later Ahmad
were to see a sovereign and independent Yemen, free from
colonial presence, and fulfill the claims on the southwest.
Russian military equipment might animate this dream.
(b) The desire to consolidate internal security. Imam Ahmad *
s
position was something less than secure, witness the al-Wazir
coup aftermath and the abortive attempt of 1955. Perhaps one
means for the imam to shore up his leadership claim was through
a strong, well-equipped military, regardless of the source of
supplies. (Ahmad was basically mistrustful of outsiders, and
was reluctant to become involved with the Russians; however,
Badr persuaded him to do so. King Saud gave him three
16
million dollars to buy arms.) The improvement to Ahmad 's
legitimacy would also be realized through emphasis on the
"threat" to Yemen posed by Aden; (concentrating on the outside
threat would win him dual rewards: a strong military and
popular support) coincidentally a series of border clashes
resulted.
(c) Improvement of Yemen's economic posture. Receiving
Russian armaments naturally held the possibility of further
trade with the Soviet Union and improvement of the economic
infrastructure; improvement of the standard of living
through industrialization might quiet dissident rumblings.
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2. Yemeni Receipt of Soviet Arms : A Chronology
The policy of arms transfers from the Soviet Union
to Yemen is inseparably linked to the Soviet policy in the
UAR; therefore, it is appropriate to digress briefly and
examine this point. The Soviet-Egyptian sponsor-client
experience serves as a model with utility for Yemen.
Starting with 1955, Egypt and the Soviet
Union concluded arms agreements roughly
every two years: the first, announced
on 27 September, 1955, was officially
concluded between Egypt and Czechoslovakia,
the latter serving largely as a formal
substitute for the Soviet Union and only
partly as supplier of her own arms. Later,
this disguise was abandoned altogether,
and the Soviet Union concluded its arms
deals directly, occasionally supplemented
with East European arms . . . The 19 5 5
agreement provided for four broad cate-
gories of arms: aircraft, tanks, other
land weapons, including artillery, and
warships; aircraft (replacements for
those lost in 1956) dominated the 1957-
59 period; in 1961, East German military
personnel were introduced; from 1962-67,
deliveries paralleled Egypt's growing
involvement in the Yemen war (a low
estimate: $220 million worth of various
armaments) . *-°
The Egyptian market for Soviet armaments proved a
priori, to be an important one, for by effecting these
transfers, Soviet foreign policy goals were being fulfilled;
further, the returns on the Soviet investment would later be
realized. However, this same arms market, rather the Egyptian
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Authoritarian gov't - - + +
Low level of econ dev.
-
+
Undermilitarized + + + + + +
Strategic Location + + + +
Raw Mat' Is/Nat. Res.
History of colonialism - +
Intractable conflicts + +
Lack of Arab unity
Metropole links
Fear of Imperialism
Sanctity of borders +
Arabs/Islam - + +
Fig. 5 Interaction of Soviet Foreign Policy
Objectives wity Yemeni Demand Factors
*Source: Laurance , E.J./ "Soviet Arms Transfers to Sub-
Saharan Africa," Unpublished Paper; adapted to
fit YAR and PDRY demand schemes. (A + or -









































Lack of Arab unity
Metropole links
Fear of Imperialism Egypt as a
regional power
Sanctity of borders
Arabs / Islam Nasir's personal
ambitions
Fig. 6 Interaction of Soviet Foreign Policy Objectives
with Yemeni Demand Factors/UAR Overlay
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Nevertheless, the USSR and the Yemen did conduct
relations; Badr was the medium by which these were largely
accomplished, resulting from his visits to several Communist
countries. In 1956, when the drama of Suez was at its
height, a Russian ship arrived at a small Yemeni port with
19
a cargo of arms, the first of many. The 1956 trade
agreement with the USSR negotiated by Badr provided (under
the label of "machinery") for the sale of five million
pounds sterling worth of small arms, anti-air guns, and
tanks; these were, for the most part, obsolete Soviet
weapons. Accordingly, the small arms were passed out among
20
Yemeni regulars and royalist tribesmen, for use against
Aden.
The Soviet relationship with Yemen during
these years, however, remained on a com-
mercial basis, and it was not their concern
if the imam wished to hide his arms in a
cave. The USSR offered Yemen a line of
credit of 100-million rubles in 1957, but
the imam accepted only 60-million ($15-mill.).
The loan had a grace period of five years,
with annual interest of 2 1/2%, and was
utilized largely for the construction of a
port at Hodeida.^l
The coup d'etat and resulting Civil War of 1962
increased the flow of Soviet arms into Yemen both via Egypt
and more directly. Although it is not apparent what the
fine points of the Soviet-Sallal relationship were, the
fact that Russian efforts were now "ideologically sanctioned'
(i.e., through 'republicanism') was not at all lost on the
Soviets; hence these improved as Sallal became the recipient
of much-needed aid, both economic and military.
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(It is hardly conceivable that al-Badr, in
arranging the technical assistance from the
USSR, could have believed that his own military
resources would be able to put the armaments to
good account. It is even more remarkable that
Nasir and Khrushchev did not come earlier to
realize the incongruities of the situation;
. . . it took them until the end of 196 2 to
put Sallal into action, and until later still
to send him substantial reinforcements. The
Cairo-Moscow axis made a serious misjudgement.
Instead of being able to unite Yemen' s military
strength with that of Egypt and set it on the
road to the southwest, all of its attention
had been turned inwards with the aim of
establishing itself for the first effective
thrust against the British.) 22
The Civil War intensified the UAR-Yemeni commitment;
a defense pact was signed on 10 November, 196 2, and Egyptian
support (in the way of personnel and equipment) began to
materialize. What is of greatest significance though, is the
signal of a Soviet strategic offensive through direct relations
with the Sallal regime. As a result of a Yemeni delegation's
visit to Moscow, the Soviets expanded their "Egyptian dealings"
through some public praise of Sallal' s efforts: the Russians
decided to build a complete airport near Sanaa, big enough to
handle the Egyptian TU-16 bombers; construction of Hodeida's
port facilities was pushed forward, with a reported presence
23
of 1,000 Soviet technicians and instructors in Yemen.
"Additionally, there was a possible causal relation-
ship between the present Soviet military (naval) build-up,
the diplomatic interest in the entire area 'East of Suez',
and the unsuccessful attempt by the Soviets to install
24
nuclear missiles in Cuba." It is of coincidental note that
one of the primary Soviet military goals during this period
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was to counter the US strategic strike threat (namely
POLARIS A- 3 followed by POSEIDON) ; what resulted was the
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) "surge" in the USSR's naval
policy and construction.
By having the ability to operate long-range
reconnaissance aircraft from Hanad (possible, as long as
the Egyptians were in-country) the US submarine fleet could
be contended with over the long run; for the short run,
Egyptian troops and equipment could be ferried directly into
Yemen more easily. To help make this offensive more
attractive to Yemen, "Soviet non-military aid increased at
the same time, with the donation of 125,000 doses of polio
vaccine, a shipload of flour, fat and sugar. Khrushchev
and Brezhnev sent the message: the Soviet people highly
appreciate the contribution of the YAR to the cause of
protecting peace and the struggle against colonialism. . .
25The Yemeni people are on the right road."
As long as the UAR was embroiled in the war, as well
as the administration of the Yemen republic, Sallal's
popularity diminished and he was no doubt pleased with the
withdrawal of UAR and Saudi forces from his country. The
war dragged on, though, for another few years, and the Soviet
commitment moved into a new dimension:
The USSR now furnished weapons directly
and with it more technicians. At the
start, Soviet pilots flew planes as air
cover for the republican troops that
were defending Sanaa against royalist
encirclement in December, 1967. When
one of the planes was shot down, the
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USSR became more cautious. Volunteer
pilots were recruited from Syria to
constitute the republican air force,
while other volunteers from Algeria
and from South Yemen reinforced the
officer corps of the ground troops. 26
As a result of the arrival of the MiG-17/19's and other
Soviet equipment, a new republican offensive began. In
February, 1968, new shipments of Soviet arms arrived at
Hodeida (including about fifty tanks) and further deliveries
were carried out by airlift: "Soviet transport planes from
Egypt carried large quantities of small arms, mortars,




The factionalism that had traditionally been among
both ranks worked to the royalist disadvantage. The
republican regime survived, but not without a new orientation
towards the USSR. The damage to Egyptian prestige as a
result of their defeat in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War,
vis-a-vis Yemen may be difficult to quantify, but there was
also damage done to the credibility of the USSR. From that
point, the relationship between Sanaa and Moscow was fractured
and the Saudi emergence as a "moderating actor" enticed the
republic into closer Saudi-Yemeni affiliation, which also
included Yemeni security needs. For Moscow, the departure
of the Egyptians meant a change of Soviet Yemeni foreign
policy was in order. The USSR was in a dilemma: the survival
of the republic was at stake; yet, with their proxies having
departed, the Soviet Union lacked the capacity to project its
2 8power and thereby influence the outcome of the Civil War.
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The new links with the Yemeni republicans
could not be of the same calibre as
relations with states professedly 'building
socialism' such as Guinea, Syria, et als.
The valuable role of the UAR in the pre-
1967 era was clear, for the missing inter-
mediary had been an inalienable link. It
had been acceptable to aid the Yemenis
in their struggle, that was all right.
The only justification available for the
Soviet aid to the Yemenis directly, however,
was the Yemeni role in the anti-imperialist
struggle. 29
The Soviets, then, opted for minimal involvement;
by transferring small arms and many obsolete weapons, they
made a policy choice that ideally would mesh with pursuit
of their strategic interests. A cautious Soviet Union,
therefore conducted its dual policy of support for recon-
ciliation among the partners to the Civil War, while
providing limited military aid to the republicans. It
was their reticence to fully involve themselves with a
regime as unstable as the one that Col. Sallal had established
—
a policy still in formulation—combined with the risk to
Soviet prestige, and the commitment to Cairo (for the
Alexandria facilities) that resulted in the focus of
Soviet attention elsewhere. Conveniently, Republican
Yemen's neighbor, recently independent and struggling to
develop a Marxist-Leninist republic, attracted these
attentions and interest. Accordingly, the Soviets merely
stepped up their supply tempo to the People's Republic of
South Yemen (PDRY after 19 70).
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C. MOSCOW AND ADEN: RAPPORT THROUGH MILITARY EXPORTS
Strong alliance with the USSR and other
countries of the socialist community is
the decisive factor of victory of the
national-liberation movement of peoples.
It is particularly necessary now in
order to oppose the forces of Zionism
and reaction, which are teaming up in
the Middle East (promoting) their
incessant hostile designs. 31
Broadcast from Aden and certified by Tass, these words
from the Prime Minister of the PDRY, Ali Nasir Muhammad,
were surely well received in Moscow, for it has been the
achievement of this end that has prompted the Soviets to
devote massive amounts of aid, both economic and military,
equipment and technicians to the Marxist regime of Aden.
1. Setting the Stage : The Economic Prelude
Strategically, the importance of the PDRY's location
cannot be disputed and the port facilities of Aden in
relation to the Strait of Bab al-Mandab, the narrow body of
water which is the Southern entrance to the Red Sea, form a
valuable "choke point". In the broader scope of analysis,
the PDRY holds territorial claims to some very valuable real
estate: "The importance of Socotra and the Gulf of Aden
lies in their control of one entrance to the Indian Ocean,
while the significance of the adjoining Arabian Sea lies in
its proximity to Soviet targets for submarine launched
32missiles." it appears that this strategic factor is a
point of salvation, for the country is plagued with extreme
poverty and has only recently begun the long journey on the
road to development. In conjunction with the Soviet desire
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to further world Communism, (or more correctly, to promulgate
the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty for socialist
states) the economic chaos in PDRY also played a role.
Though political and geostrategic gain served as primary
determinants, South Yemen's economic devastation after a
cessation of 130 years of British rule and its potential for
restructuring along Marxist-Leninist lines was also factored
into the Soviet decision.
The oppression of the people of Yemen under
British occupation was particularly severe.
The economy was tied to the British economy
and made entirely subservient to its needs
in both production and exports. A partic-
ular feature of British colonial rule in
Yemen was the failure to encourage the
development of all levels of agriculture
in order to make up for the country's
industrial backwardness unless this happened
to coincide with British requirements for
cash crops or foodstuffs. The Yemen was
essentially a service economy with no
agricultural or industrial base, and the
inheritance of the colonial past was a
major burden for the revolutionary govern-
ment when it faced the task of drawing up
a new economic policy. 33
As previously demonstrated, political instability in
South Yemen was a function of economic problems in that
country. Relative deprivation, a growing trade union move-
ment, and loss of revenue from closure of the Suez Canal
placed the newly formed republic in economic dire straits.
Soviet economic planners could offer relief as well as
develop a market for Soviet goods, the fishing fleet and the
merchant marine. The favorable terms offered by the Communist
countries coupled with a seeming lack of interest on the part




should turn to the Eastern Bloc. (In fact, the Great
Corrective Move of 22 June, 1969, the Three Year Plan of
19 71-74, and the Five Year Development Plan of 19 74-75 were
drawn up with Soviet assistance.) Not to belabor a point,
but merely to stress the economic importance as a determinant
for Soviet involvement, some definitive statistics are
provided.
Although the PDRY has been running a consistent
balance of payments deficit since 1969, this has been offset
to some degree by the huge amounts of Soviet economic aid
that has been provided. (Table 1 refers.)
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73 75 76 77
8 14 8 26 29
-87 -120 -165 -267 -324
-79 -106 -157 -241 -295
80 54 76 -145 -205
57 33 56 115 180
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5 25 32 60 69
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-1 -2 -1
-13 23 16 -21 7
-6 -4 -24 -13 40
SOURCE:
World Bank Country Study : PDRY
(Washington: World Bank, 19 79)
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Total disbursed assistance to PDRY in the
period 1969-77 is estimated cumulatively
at about $250 million in long-term loans
(2/3 from socialist countries) and $113
million in grants. The latter are a
comparatively new feature of PDRY ' s ex-
ternal finance, begun in 1975 and originate
from Arab countries (Libya, Iraq, etc.).
The bulk of official developmental assis-
tance made available to PDRY in earlier
years originated from socialist countries
and UN aid agencies. The USSR was prin-
cipally involved in the agricultural
sector (irrigation works, establishment
of state farms) and fisheries (particularly
processing) . . . The heavy inflow of
foreign resources has inevitably led to a
rapid accumulation of PDRY's external
public debt even through part of the aid
was given in grant form. At the end of
19 77, the total external debt amounted
to $432 million. 35
Military expenditures have remained relatively high
(fluctuating around 10% of GNP since 1969-70) . It should be
noted that in PDRY, the armed forces participate when
required in certain areas of economic activity, including
public works, harvesting of crops, and the imparting of
educational and technical skills.
TABLE 2 DEFENSE EXPENDITURES (Yemeni Denari/Millions*
)





as % tot. as %
Expends. of tot.
FY 1969/70 16.8 8.2 7.6 48.8 9.5
FY 1973/74 35.0 10.4 12.1 29.7 34.6
FY 1976 78.4 17.1 39.2 21.9 50.1
FY 1977 101.4 18.9 57.0 18.6 56.2
* (YD1 = US $2.90)
SOURCE:
World Bank Country Study : PDRY
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The 1977 GNP was $470 million. The PDRY's major
trade partners include: North Yemen, East African states,
imports from various Communist states, the Persian Gulf
states, and there are refined petroleum exports to the
United Kingdom and Japan. The major industry is petroleum
refinement, but the majority of the population is engaged
in subsistence agriculture and fishing. This grim economic
picture, then, serves as one of the determinants for the
course of political events particularly in the foreign policy
arena, and moreover as a precursor for Soviet involvement.
For instance, South Yemeni political ambitions have been
assessed as, "the single discordant (Peninsular) political
note, but to date, the most notable achievements of the
South Yemenis have been their overthrow of the traditional
hierarchy and attempts to assist rebels in the Dhofar
Province of Oman. More significantly, they continue to
flirt with the Soviets and thus to raise Saudi concerns as
36
a potential Communist foothold on the Arabian Peninsula."
The brief history of South Yemen is highlighted by
an increasingly radical policy-line accompanied by endemic
37financial crises and a ruthless power struggle in the NLF.
Zealous Marxist ideals abounded from the NLF leadership;
they were overconfident from their recent combat successes
and there were a number of young radicals in the country
desiring immediate political, socio-economic reform, (in
other words, total ) at any risk. Fortunately, a more
moderate, rather pragmatic tack was followed, based on the
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realization that too rapid a change could produce
devastating results.
As soon as the PRSY was formed, the USSR established
diplomatic relations; however, early on, there was little
aid in the form of money and hardware to accompany the
verbal support. There are speculations that the Soviets
were somewhat reticent to initially provide complete support
to this young movement, perhaps recalling the difficulties
with their investment in the UAR and being skeptical of an
avowedly (i.e., truly) Marxist regime. It is likely that
they were awaiting the precise opportunity. The Soviets
also desired to maintain a degree of leverage over their
clients as demonstrated through commitments to others:
boosting the morale of the recipient, but leaving certain
strings attached (as may be seen upon receipt of various
types of equipment) until the nation had been properly
assuaged, groomed and tested, ready to be brought up to
operational status.
In 1969, desperately needing foreign assistance,
PDRY President Ash-Sha'Abi visited the USSR. "During the
visit, agreements on economic and technical cooperation
38
and air communications were signed." This point was of
great significance to the Soviets as it afforded them landing
possibilities enroute to the Indian Ocean and its littorals.
What pervaded this relationship was Soviet apprehension of
the "pragmatic" president (espousing "scientific socialism"),
in conjunction with the PRC opening of an embassy in Aden.
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What may not have been readily apparent to the Soviets was
that the PDRY was sending signals of invitation to the USSR
to straighten out the internal chaos; an ideal opportunity
for the Soviets to obtain the coveted political influence.
"Devoted to Marxist-Leninist ideology and hypnotized by
dogmatic interpretations, the NLF radicals completely ignored
South Yemen's economic realities and were determined to
transform their country's backward capitalist (and to a
great extent pre-capitalist) economy into a socialist one
in the shortest possible time. Foreign assets and several
branches of the PRSY economy were nationalized immediately;
39
and in 1970, agrarian reform was implemented." Unfortunately,
the synthesis resulting from this leadership produced anarchy
which saw rampant unemployment and was pointing in the
ultimate direction of bankruptcy. Essentially, the Soviets
40
were needed to bail out the South Yemenis.
When presented with the long-term yields that an
association with the PDRY offered— furtherment of Marxist-
Leninist ideology, entrenchment in this area of the globe,
and enhancement of Soviet prestige, not to mention the
economic benefits that would eventually be realized—how
could they refuse? The War of Ramadan (or Yom Kippur,
considering one's perspective) and the energy crisis that
followed as a consequence emphasized two points for the
Russians: a) Aden's strategic worth, and b) the value of
the PDRY to undertake tasks that would benefit the USSR,
(i.e., in the joint-security interests of the USSR and PDRY),
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merely serving to reinforce the decision. For example,
during the 1973 war, elements of the PDRY Navy helped to
block the Bab al-Mandab to Israeli navigation. Arab use
of oil as a weapon during the aftermath made relations with
South Yemen very important—considering its routes to the
oil resources. Because of the Soviet physical presence in
the Middle East during this war, (Syria, Iraq, PDRY) , a
deterrent effect to Western escalation resulted. The USSR's
position in the PDRY, then, became a strong one because
Soviet expertise and assistance was needed to withstand
heavy pressure from its neighbors (encouraged by the US and
41the growing Iranian forces active in Dhof ar)
.
The Saudis, in an effort to counter this situation,
began a campaign to bring the PDRY regime back into the
Arab camp by "bankrolling" the economy, but provided little
military equipment. The Arab summit in Rabat in 19 74 also
produced some Gulf state monies for the PDRY—earmarked for
the "moderation" campaign. For a short while, this was well
received in Aden, (i.e., as long as remaining in the moderate
camp directed South Yemeni ire towards Israel or the West)
and proved to be in the regime's best interest. (Further,
the Saudis realized that easing tensions within PDRY would
also mean less Yemeni support for the Dhofar rebels.) The
Marxist-Leninist ideology of the Ruba'i Ali government was
not easily altered, as the Saudi Royal family discovered
when fraternal assistance was also provided to the Eritrean
rebels, later on; this was due primarily to ideological
convictions vice military/strategic reasons.
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2. A South Yemeni Chronological Receipt of Soviet Arms
Information on Soviet military aid to (Yemen and)
South Yemen has been fragmentary, partly because of the
civil war in the 1960's, the strife produced by the tran-
sition of the Federation to independence and the severance
42
of normal relations with the West. Perhaps the first
identifiable quantities of Soviet military equipment
arrived during the civil war when Soviet-made combat air-
craft were detected; some as outright gifts and some on
loan. When the Civil War was settled, the chance for
direct Soviet involvement with Aden improved immensely.
As relations improved between these two nations, Moscow
commenced the arms transfer process with 27 July, 1968
being the arrival date of the first Soviet weapons in Aden.
Later that year, the shipments included a number of T-34
tanks, and in addition, about 50 South Yemenis were granted
43
scholarships in the Soviet Union. This relationship
continued to improve as the new radical regime was lured
closer to the communist camp.
In 1969, the Soviet Union delivered
twelve MiG-17's to Southern Yemen.
By January, 19 70, these planes were
being operated from the ex-RAF base
at Khormasaka in Aden. Reportedly,
they were maintained by East European
technicians. It was estimated that
100 Soviet experts, mostly military
were in the country by the end of
1969. It was also announced that
the Soviet Union had granted 150




Improving the armed forces and building the national
infrastructure were possible through an alliance with the
USSR; "e.g.: Soviet assitance was far more diversified and
sophisticated than Chinese and included large quantities of
relatively modern arms, either given or sold at a great
discount on long-term credit. South Yemeni officers,
technicians and pilots, were trained in the USSR and Soviet
experts built military installations in the PDRY and trained
45its military forces."
By the end of May, 19 72, PDRY had received, in
addition to various artillery pieces, over 50 T-34 tanks,
20 MiG-17/19's, fighter interceptors, several transport
bombers, helicopters and a small number of patrol boats.
Unconfirmed reports claimed that PDRY was given a squadron
of MiG-21's and more sophisticated weapons. According to
an exiled South Yemeni Prime Minister, more than 600 Soviet
experts went to Aden after their services in Egypt were
46terminated in July, 1972, and were still there in 1973.
Perhaps further justification for the increasing
amounts of aid which flowed into the PDRY was provided after
reports of "British-Saudi-CIA" plots against the government
manifested in the Soviet press, border pressures, and the
opportunity for Moscow to make certain strides (to obvious
military ends) in the situation. What the Soviets expected
to gain in return for the economic and military aid was
base rights, transforming a "toe-hold" in the area into a
genuine foot-hold, and the development of a client-state,
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potentially to be employed in a surrogate manner. (The
closing of Bab al-Mandab has already been cited, but also
of significance was the Soviet airlift and major re-supply
operation to Ethiopia during the height of the Ethiopian-




Over time, one observes the continual growth of the
PDRY armed forces and most notably, the steady influx of
Soviet equipment. (Refer to Table 3) There still exists
continued fragmentation of specific information regarding
the terms of trade, and other mechanics of Soviet-PDRY
transactions, but nevertheless certain indicators are
apparent to assist in drawing conclusions.
Placing these arms transfer statistics into per-
spective with Soviet global aims requires some further data,
(recently made available through the CIA) , demonstrating and
re-emphasizing that "Moscow once again focused on military
aid as its most effective means of building up influence in
48
the Third World." At the same time, the USSR expanded
economic and technological cooperation with lesser developed
countries in order to consolidate political gains and to
assure markets and raw material supplies for various branches
49
of Soviet industry, (witness the PDRY's recently received
technical/agricultural assistance) . In attempting to gauge
what motivating factors are driving the Moscow-Aden arms
transfer relationship, the empirical evidence of military
advisors/technicians partially provides this basis.
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TABLE 4 COMMUNIST MILITARY TECHNICIANS IN LDC's, 1977*
Total USSR & E. EURO. CUBA PRC
Middle iEast 4,380 3,380 500
YAR 100 100
PDRY 700 350 350 Persons












Communist Aid to LDC ' s of the Free World , 19 77 ;
CIA Research Paper, November, 1978
Additionally, the number of academic students being trained
in Communist countries as of December, 19 77 for North and
South Yemen was 850 and 555, respectively, (take from the
same source) . A consistently accurate number of foreign
national military advisors present in PDRY is not readily
discernable:
About 10,000 foreigners were in South
Yemen— 4,000 Russians, 3,500 Cubans
who trained and controlled the militia,
and 1,100 E. Germans who controlled the
security forces— a South Yemeni officer
who fled to Oman told the daily Times
of Oman on 22 February 79. Hatred of
these foreigners, arbitrary arrest and
imprisionment, and conscription of
adults between 16 and 55 has caused





Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports by Country by Year
Arms IMP Arms XPT Total IMP Total XPT Arms %tot
YEAR Mill. $* MUX. $* Mill. $* Mill. $* IMP XPT
ADEN
1967 -
1968 2 205 110 1
1969 6 218 144 3
1970 4 201 146 2
1971 5 157 105 3
1972 20 149 108 13
1973 42 171 113 25
1974 43 406 242 11
1975 36 312 187 12
1976 38 1 NA NA NA NA
SANAA
1967 10 35 4 28
1968 5 35 4 14
1969 1 36 4 3
1970 2 32 3 6
1971 34 4
1972 9 80 4 11
1973 3 125 8 2
1974 14 190 13 7
1975 15 294 11 5
1976 17
^Current $.
NA NA NA NA
i Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers
,
1967-1976, USACDA Pub. $98, July 1978,
p. 155.
TABLE 7
VALUE OF ARMS TRANSFERS CUyiULATIVE 1973-77 (Mill. $**)
Recipient Total US USSR FRANCE UK PRC FRG OTHER
ADEN 170 — 160 — 1 10
SANAA 86 16 30 10 - 20
Source:
USACDA Pub.
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1968-1971,
#100, October 1979, p. 156.
** Million $ current.
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The February-March 19 79 war between the Yemens was
a good opportunity for the Soviets to step up the tempo of
their weapons transfers, to "combat test" their commitments
and conduct a "live fire" exercise, perhaps grading the
PDRY's performance as prospective surrogates. (The timeli-
ness of the attack may have been related to South Yemen's
desire to exploit its current superiority in military
equipment.) At any rate, the Soviets attached a great
deal of significance to this conflict, (as to what degree
international timing played in the decision to commence
hostilities is not readily apparent, but this action took
place shortly after the Soviet-backed Vietnamese felt the
brunt of the PRC retaliatory campaign: January 1979), as
evidenced here:
Diplomatic sources in London have confirmed
reports of a massive Soviet arms lift to
South Yemen in the month preceeding the
outbreak of the Yemeni war, the Times of
Oman reported on 22 March 79.
According to the report, Soviet military
equipment including tanks, armored cars and
heavy vehicles "poured" into Aden in January.
The Soviet naval presence increased and 17
warships and 3 submarines reportedly remain
in the Bab al-Mandeb. A large air base has
recently been completed at Makasar, near
Mukalla, and Soviet-piloted MiG-23/25/27
s
are operating from it.^2
"That the USSR was aiding and abetting a military
buildup in South Yemen far in excess of that country's
normal needs was evident to US strategists. Equipment
such as heavy rocket launchers, to which the YAR had no
reply, was being shipped to Aden flown to old RAF bases in
84

the north of the former British protectorate, and then
53transferred by helicopter to the border." There were
also reports of pinpoint artillery shelling and highly
coordinated attacks pointing to the Soviet advisory role.
The deliveries evidently resulted from the 15-year military
agreement signed by Moscow and Aden of June 19 78. Among
its terms was the construction of a naval base offering the
54Soviets repairs, storage, and communication facilities.
This agreement was one that was a long time in materializing,
but was certainly welcomed in Moscow as well as Aden: "in
addition the Soviet Union is reported to construct an air-
base for the South Yemeni air force, also providing
facilities for the Soviet air force; ... to supply 30 MiG
aircraft of an unspecified type, five patrol boats, and a
major radar network to cover parts of the Gulf and Southern
55Arabia." It is apparent that the Soviet logic involves
providing weapons systems to the South Yemenis that would
fulfill not only PDRY's, but also the Soviet's own needs.
At Soviet behest, the German Democratic Republic
sent a military mission to Aden (November 1977) to instigate
a major buildup in the PDRY armed forces, including reorgan-
ization and the task of running three training camps for
5 6
terrorists and guerillas. The Cairo press attempted to
link the terrorist activities, Soviet involvement, and the
patterns of hostilities according to the Middle East News
Agency (MENA) in translation of the magazine Akher Saa ;
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the article was said to emanate from an Arab diplomat who
had recently returned from Aden:
The magazine said that two months before
the start of the recent fighting the
Soviet Union supplied the government of
Aden with squadrons of MiG-21 aircraft
flown by Cuban pilots and with missile
batteries which were positioned on the
border. Specific numbers were not given.
The report also said that groups of
militia men had returned from Moscow
after completing their training on modern
T-52 and T-62 Soviet tanks. These tanks
had been used in the battles. Akher Saa
said that the Soviet Union had chosen a
moment for the Aden government to start
its border operations against the Sanaa
government when Arab and world attention
was busy with the events in Iran and the
war between Vietnam and China. Soviet
experts were administering and operating
the airfields and missile bases estab-
lished along PDRY's border with Saudi
Arabia.
The magazine also said that groups
of the Palestinian rejection front had
arrived in Aden to train infiltrators
in sabotage operations and guerilla
warfare in special camps under the
supervision of Muhsen Sharjabi, head
of the intelligence service in Aden,
before going across the border to Sanaa.
Special groups had also been formed to
carry our assassination operations
against a number of people who opposed
the pro-Soviet regime in South Yemen. *'
Again, from a global perspective, "the establish-
ment of naval and airbases on or near the principal oil
routes is more important in the global balance than
5 8
military support for client states." In this respect,
seapower and subsequent power-pro jection-ashore is quite
important, as recently demonstrated to the South Yemenis:
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A Soviet carrier task force recently went
through its paces for the Marxist govern-
ment of Southern Yemen, Pentagon sources
reported. The sources said that the
carrier MINSK plus an amphibious assault
ship and a 'Kara* class cruiser anchored
in the Southern Yemeni capital of Aden on
26 May 79 . . . Then the ships staged a
short cruise where the MINSK demonstrated
the capabilities of her V/STOL aircraft and
the amphib opened the clamshell doors on
her bow. 59
and as perhaps another gauge:
A Soviet missile-carrying nuclear submarine
accompanied by a tender has entered Aden,
the Southern Yemen port dominating Middle
East tanker routes, Navy (i.e., USN)
intelligence sources said.
A spokesman for the commander-in-
chief in the Pacific, ADM M. Weisner,
confirmed the report. The sources said
it was not known whether the warship was
at Aden on a temporary assignment, or was
the vanguard of other Soviet vessels pre-
paring to establish a new Soviet naval
base on the tip of the Arabian Peninsula.
The spokesman identified the submarine
as a "cruise missile-carrying Echo II class
boat" comparable in size and firepower to
American submarines of the Ethen Allen type,
one of the Navy's biggest and fastest
submarines. 60
And still:
The Soviet Union has completed the con-
struction of a military base on the Red
Sea island of Socotra, according to the
Cairo daily Al -Ahram , 17 May 79. The
base has a sophisticated electronic
surveillance system and a communications
center for tracking satellites, as well
as long-range missile sites and facilities
for submarines and warships, the paper
said. The base has been built to re-
place lost facilities in Somalia. 61
The Soviet-South Yemeni joint security interests
are further enhanced through the establishment of a

40,000-man multinational paratroop force based in PDRY.
Basing this unit here is in keeping with the Soviet
doctrine of "correlation of forces" in a region prior to
conflict. The airborne, quick-reaction force with its
Soviet/East German/Cuban advisors reportedly has its own
military supply depot which is essential for staging and
conduct of strike operations in the Persian Gulf, the
fi 2
Horn, or on the Arabian Peninsula.
3 . Soviet Use of Proxies : The Cubans of the Middle
East ?
The philosophy of surrogate warfare is a concept
with which the Russians are intimately familiar; from their
early experiences in the UAR until the present, they have
deloped a proficiency in translating this doctrine into
action. For the Soviets, this has been profitable both
politically, through enhancement of Russian prestige and
ideological furtherment, as well as economically, first
through arms transfer-related profits and then as a
stimulus for Soviet commercial ventures. However, in the
case of Yemen (as in Ethiopia) , the Soviets have established
a presence in a strategic sector of the Middle East. By
cultivating the relationship between Aden and Moscow a
dependency has been created with an awesome potential.
A graphic representation of Soviet foreign policy
goals and structural factors with the interaction of PDRY's
demand rationale summarizes this relationship. (See figs.
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Fig. 8 Interaction of Soviet Foreign Policy
Objectives with PDRY Demand Factors
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consideration when forecasting South Yemen's Middle East
theatre role. Beginning with this premise, there is
evidence to construct this analogy: South Yemen— the
Cuba of the Middle East.
The South Yemenis, by virtue of their Peninsular
discordance, have become somewhat isolated. They are
unpopular with the traditional regional powers and
present a potentially destabilizing threat; "the South
Yemenis are not held in high esteem in the Arab world
because of their Soviet dealings. Therefore, close
relations with the USSR offers not only an attractiveness,
but also certain "redeeming" aspects (for PDRY) and ease
the negative effects of isolation. This is underscored
through the signing of a PDRY-Soviet Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation on 25 October, 1979. A side effect of
this treaty was the Soviet and Cuban decision to increase
64the number of their advisors in-country to 15,000.
The further role of the Soviet and Cuban advisors,
then, is merely speculative. Given the proven intimacy
between the Soviet Union and Cuba, adding the PDRY to this
existing power structure may indicate Moscow's desire to
have the South Yemenis also perform essentially Russian-
engineered military operations.
The sociology of the arms transfer process may be
seen working to Soviet advantage, for by providing modern
weapons systems to an essentially developing people, a
dependency of sorts is created—on spare parts, repairmen,
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instructors, etc. The technology transfer also serves as
a vehicle for ideological and cultural exchange, as has
been shown; not to mention the accompanying hard currency
benefits.
From this estimation, one may conclude that the
present relationship between Moscow and Aden is more than
a quick-fix target of opportunity for the Soviets; it is
a complex arrangement with many of its fine points only
implied or left to the deduction of the individual analyst.
Additionally, there are a myriad of ultimate objectives
involved; both from the standpoint of one of the super-
powers and an emerging Marxist republic, few of which are
obvious. Exactly what these Middle Eastern "Cubans" may
undertake, be it furthering subversion, mustering pro-
Soviet sentiments, assisting other liberation movements,
or performing any number of tactical assignments is
integrally linked to Soviet arms transfers and the PDRY
acquisition, as the actual conduct of operations is a
function of the possession of the necessary capabilities.
With this hypothetical situation in mind, a recent
event may serve as yet another indicator of this affiliation
as an eventuality. In November, 1979, the most holy site
in Islam, the Grand Mosque in Mecca, was the target of a
carefully planned military assault. Intelligence reports
of the incident uncovered that the plot was inspired by
South Yemen and Libya: an attempt at kidnapping the
Saudi King, Khalid, and instituting fundamental Islamic
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reforms, the apparent motive. The attack was mounted by
6 7
a self-proclaimed mahdi (messiah) and his 500 followers.
The arms for this group were brought into Mecca in containers
from Libya and PDRY via Beirut. This incident, aimed at
the Saudi monarchy, (though probably not engineered by
the Soviets) , most probably took place with KGB fore-
knowledge. Moscow might exploit this sort of occurrence
to its advantage, via South Yemen and other nations in the
area friendly to the Soviet Union.
On an explicitly military basis, the Soviet and
Cuban advisors in Aden illustrate the possibility of
regional Angola-style campaigns. That the PDRY has the
Soviet-provided capacity to offer assistance external to
the Arabian Peninsula is demonstrated by this discovery:
Egypt's influential daily, Al Ahram , has
reported that two South Yemeni infantry
regiments were dispatched to Afghanistan
to fight alongside the Afghan regular
army and Soviet troops. In a story date-
lined Aden, Al Ahram said Yemeni troops
were "part of an operation to replace
Soviet troops." The South Yemeni troops
are to play the role of Soviet surro-
gates, the same role played by Cubans
in Africa in recent months. The Yemenis,
being Muslims, are likely to raise less
of a political story than the Cubans in
a predominantly Muslim Afghanistan. 6°
Based on the available evidence, it appears that
the PDRY not only has both the potential and the demon-




IV. SINO-SOVIET " ONE-UPMANSHIP " IN THE YEMENS
"What kind of spirit is this that makes a
foreigner selflessly adopt the cause of the
Chinese people's liberation as his own? It is
the spirit of internationalism."
Chairman Mao Tse-Tung
A. THE PARAMETERS OF COMPETITION
A significant phase of Yemeni history was the period in
which both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet
Union vied for influence in the YAR and the PDRY. For nearly
twenty years, from the late 19 50 *s through the mid-1970's,
these two Communist giants provided developmental assistance
in a competitive manner to the two Arab states; the results
of their efforts were as divergent as their motives. The
intent of this chapter is to demonstrate how the competition
between the PRC and the USSR reflected their respective
foreign policies in this period, and how Moscow achieved a
relative advantage over Peking.
The availability of unclassified, hard data to empirically
quantify the level of Sino-Soviet rivalry in the Middle East
in general and in the Yemens particularly, is limited. There-
fore, in making this appraisal, the output analysis technique
(of Soviet and Chinese foreign policies) has been employed.
In this regard, the Chinese experience in the Arab world has
been punctuated by shifting national objectives. The PRC '
s
experiment in the PDRY and in the YAR reflects these policy
shifts; the broader implications relate to Chinese superpower
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aspirations and attempts to counter Soviet advances, first
through ideological exports, then followed by the wave of
current pragmatism.
When the PRC was born in 1949, it emerged from a long
and decimating civil war. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
enjoyed significant popularity and shared an ideological
common ground with the Soviet Union, namely an adherence to
Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The two entered into a relation-
ship that produced mutual goals and, what appeared to many
Westerners, a monolithic Communist threat.
Stalin's succession by Nakita Khrushchev added a strain
to this association, for with his premiership, difficulties
began to surface concerning the character of the epoch
(i.e., the international balance of power), the path to
2
socialism, and the concept of peaceful coexistence; moreover,
the PRC began to emerge as a more independent actor in their
relationship. These difficulties manifested themselves in
the form of clashes between Russian and Chinese personalities,
Khrushchev's and Mao Tse-Tung's. The combined result of these
differences formed the basis for angry Chinese polemics aimed
at the Moscow "revisionist renegade clique" of "social
imperialism," the betrayers of world revolution. (Soviet
counter-charges against the "Maoist cult of personality" were
the typical rebuttal.) Indeed this dispute had a fragmentary
effect on world Communism, as the USSR could not maintain
hegemony over the PRC; "this internationalist aspect increased
especially after the PRC refused satellite status and demanded
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parity with the USSR. The disagreement's ideological
4dimension escalated into open and bitter conflict." The
severity of this conflict was demonstrated during the 1969
border clashes on the Ussuri River, where the aftermath of
this limited engagement threatened to produce a nuclear
5
exchange. As neither the USSR nor the PRC could afford
the consequences of global war, alternate means of expression
were necessary. The Third World provided the ideal "battle-
ground. "
There is voluminous literature devoted to the subject of
the Sino-Soviet rift, as well as numerous speculations about
the probable determinants. Beginning with the premise that
this dispute translated into competitive foreign policies,
to examine the case of Yemen and the split in terms of the
following hypothesis would be fitting: "Perhaps the PRC's
efforts were fostered by an ideological cleavage with the
Soviet Union, with an overlay of resurgent Chinese nationalism."
(The assumption is made that a degree of Russian imperialism
exists on the part of the USSR.) This would explain the
separate approaches in their relations with selected "promising"
regimes (i.e., those potentially receptive to Marxist-Leninist
social order restructuring) and the assistance the two were
both willing and able to provide. The YAR and the PDRY
function as a suitable test case.
B. ORIGINS AND EXTENT OF CHINESE INVOLVEMENT
"As Sino-Soviet friction mounted in the late 1950' s,
Peking placed growing emphasis on China's affinity with those
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areas of the Third World where Moscow had serious historical
and contemporary stakes. During 1955-57, China's relations
with most Arab states were a function of direct Chinese-
Egyptian relations," which at this point were their most
cordial. For instance, China provided the UAR with a good
deal of assistance during the Suez crisis: rolled steel, a
$4.7 million grant, volunteers for the fight against Israel,
7
and a market for Egyptian cotton. As Egypt attempted to
pursue nonaligned foreign relations, China emphasized the
two countries' "Afro-Asianness" and pushed an anti-Soviet
line in the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization. The
Yemen (Imamate) and the PRC established diplomatic relations
in 1956 and in so doing followed in the footsteps of Egypt
g
and Syria (the UAR ties being the most likely impetus)
.
The growing troubles between the PRC and the USSR forced
Egypt to sever relations with China, leaning in effect, to
the Soviet side, which was not surprising given the Russian
investments in that country. However, when Sino-Egyptian
relations ended, the ties that China had forged in Yemen
remained (recalling the Soviet hesitancy to establish strong
bilateral relations with Yemen and the Egyptian "buffer");
the door was opened for an improved Sino-Yemeni rapport.
Crown Prince Badr paid a month- long visit to Peking in which
a treaty of friendship and commerce, and an agreement on
scientific, technical and cultural cooperation between the
two nations were concluded. Additionally, the PRC affirmed
its support of the Yemeni claim to territories under British
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protection and new premises were completed with financial
9
assistance for the Institute of Islamic Theology.
The 1962 Revolution, from which the Republic sprang into
existence, marked the possibility of fertile political
exchanges for Peking . . .
. . . the radical outlook of many
Yemeni revolutionaries after 196 2 found
a sympathetic response in Peking. If
(the PRO sought its "Albania" in the
Arab world, Yemen for some years was a
leading candidate. The magnitude of the
Chinese threat to Soviet policies, however,
should not be exaggerated. Chinese aid and
technical assistance were small compared to
Russian and trade remained negligible; mean-
while, arms, the principal commodity of
interest to Sanaa during the long struggle
with the royalists, were provided by Moscow,
not Peking. 1°
Considering the limited physical ability of the PRC to
project itself in the Third World, the Yemen experience is
noteworthy. The primary vehicle for this effort was through
friendly diplomatic and political relations, combined with
labor-intensive projects, designed to impress, and benefit
the burgeoning Republic. For example, when President Sallal
visited the PRC in 1964, he received a "tumultuous" welcome,
attributed to "Peking's continuing effort to develop closer
ties with African states and represent itself to them as a
more appealing ally than the Soviet Union." Evidently, a
popularity for the Chinese in Yemen resulted. Remaining
somewhat aloof from politics (e.g.: no evidence of Chinese
subversion as compared to Soviet complicity in anti-govern-
ment conspiracies) , they were very professional in constructing
roads, a textile mill, and a technical high school; Chinese
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12foremen worked side by side with Yemeni laborers. (One
further comparison to the Soviet efforts: they embarked on
projects with long-term Soviet benefits—development of the
Hodeida port facilities, expansion of the Sanaa airport and
building of telecommunications facilities with East German
help.) 13
In 1966, China changed the course of her foreign policy
and turned inward; the Cultural Revolution heralded two years
of Chinese isolation and essentially her withdrawal from the
international scene. The routine management of this event
prevented PRC leaders from involving themselves in such
things as the 1967 Arab-Israeli War (save for token wheat
offerings to Egypt); however, in 1968, when China emerged
from this introspection, there were changes in her Middle
14
East foreign policy and in the international state system.
The PRC ' s foreign policy, though still "radical", was tempered
with pragmatism hereafter. In the case of Yemen, this meant
lending implicit approval to North Yemen's shifting alignment,
(i.e., away from the USSR and towards Saudi Arabia and the
West) , and increasing trade.
Concomitantly in 196 8, the PRC established diplomatic
relations with South Yemen. At first, China's involvement
was indirect and mainly within the framework of its
16
revolutionary anti-colonialist policy; however, as the
PRC perceived the threat from the USSR to be more to China's
own strategic/national interests, practicality refined
ideology. While providing assistance to the YAR, "the
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Chinese credit extended to the PDRY was the first from a
socialist country, and progress on a number of Chinese-
supported projects was reported. Meanwhile, Peking found
many supporters among the wide spectrum of radicals in
Southern Yemen, both in and out of the NLF (certainly there
were more Maoists in Southern Yemen relative to its size
17than in any other Arab state)." In fact, the Ash-Shabi
regime, although critical of the extreme leftists, allowed
the PRC to establish its largest diplomatic mission in the
Middle East in Aden and to conduct an extensive economic
18
survey of the country. Relations improved considerably
once Salem Rubai Ali came to power; he followed the Chinese
model of agrarian reform, forced collectivization, and
nationalization of industry. As the success of these policies
was limited, Chinese credibility was placed in jeopardy.
In keeping with the commitment of helping bring about
world revolution, China provided tacit support to the
"progressive" forces in the region. Since 1967, the
Palestine Liberation Organization and the Popular Front for
19
the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (later PFLO) ,
along with insignificant other groups received Chinese lip-
service and varying degrees of hardware. However, the
economic and logistic constraints involved in providing
meaningful support to these movements were entirely too
taxing on the PRC. Additionally, this region (save for
the PDRY) was not particularly receptive to the liberation
concept; the majority of the emirates and sheikhdoms had
100

legitimacy among their subjects resulting in loyalty to the
government. Finally, the post-Cultural Revolution view of
the world, the decision to respond to a possible Sino-
American rapprochement and the insecurity resulting from
the Czechoslovakian invasion coupled with the Chenpao/Ussuri
River border conflicts, brought about a fundamental shift
in dealings with the Yemens
.
For the Soviets, the Chinese presence in PDRY presented
problems as previously experienced in the North— this was not
at all unlike the similar rivalry in Africa (an ideological
"one-upsmanship" series of maneuvers) which had to be held
in check. The PRC exploitation of the Arab-Chinese racial
identification and socio-economic likeness would be benefical
and could probably offset any Soviet gains. (The corollary
to this possibility is that through Peking's "software"
approach, China was able to ensure that Soviet hardware was
used to its advantage in Dhofar. The USSR then, "assisted
in destabilizing efforts of the Gulf rebels, contrary to its
interest in maintaining good relations with Iran, Iraq and
20in securing Gulf oil for Eastern Europe and itself.)"
The Ali regime realized the limitations of China's
ability to assist the PDRY as the tempo of Soviet aid
increased. The PRC could provide Little Red Books and
21
revolutionary slogans, but little else. That fact not-
withstanding, the Ismail-Ali rivalry in PDRY forced Ali to
maintain his ties with the PRC and thereby offset Soviet
advances. As Ali was pro-Peking in his orientation and
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represented an even more militant Yemeni faction, it seemed
natural to structure the People's militia on the Chinese
model and with Chinese aid. (Chinese arms and a military
delegation had already reached Aden at the beginning of
22
1971.) With the collapse of the Dhofar Rebellion in
1976, China was no longer a credible military actor; "the
subsequent role of the military mission remained a matter
23
of conjecture."
Chinese achievements in South Yemen, other than those
defense-related, include establishment of a Yemeni medical
facility with ten Chinese physicians; increased assistance
to the Yemeni fishing industry, including several fishing
vessels built in the PRC and a fish-canning factory;
construction of a textile mill with a production capacity
24
of seven million yards of cotton per year. Again, as in
the YAR, the assistance provided by the PRC was essentially
labor-intensive, non-military when compared to the USSR's
military orientation. In this connection, China could
compete with the Soviet Union and still hope to gain the
coveted political influence. By modifying foreign policy
goals and subsequent interpretation of Marxist-Leninist
tenet (i.e., the evolution of 'scientific socialism') the
PRC could conduct diplomatic and economic relations with
such states as Kuwait and Iran, while at the same time,
pursue the strategic objective of countering, or at least
contending with the Soviet Union, who was at this point
perceived as Peking's primary adversary.
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C. PRESENT AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF COMPETITION
With the death of Mao Tse-Tung, the fall of Lin Piao and
the Gang of Four and Teng Tsiao-ping's installation as Vice
Premier, the wave of pragmatism in Chinese foreign relations
has grown. In the Middle East, this means that Chinese and
Soviet presence is a formula for competition.
China is accelerating its insistent
wooing of Arab states as part of its
effort to stymy Soviet advances. A low-
key diplomatic approach, common interests
in oil and burgeoning trade links smoothe
the courtship. But China's efforts
remain too weak to protect Peking's major
strategic interests in the region and China
still wields no real influence in the Middle
East, remaining at the mercy of events such
as the Shah's fall and the unexpected
dramatic resurgence of Islam as a political
force.
The diplomatic push by Peking is
concentrated particularly around the
favorite Soviet hunting ground, the Red
Sea and the Gulf. (Vice premiers and
chairmen of the PRC parliament have
recently completed lengthy missions
there. ) 25
The PRC, at a relative military disadvantage, (i.e., to
provide protracted security assistance) and with a xenophobic
Middle Kingdom legacy, has incorporated the Confucian concept
"Li" into its foreign relations with the Arab world. Perhaps
it is a means of better relating to the adherents of Islam;
"Li" embodies conservatism, realism, politeness, and a
constant quest for harmony. It does not, however, include
altruism (meaning that the motive for this stance is the
pursuit of China's strategic and national interests). 26
With ideological metaphors and Maoist rhetoric having set
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the tone of previous endeavors, adopting this new tactic
is not surprising. Paralleling the shift in diplomacy has
been the on-going construction phase of the PRC relations
with both Yemens. The Chinese can compete with the Soviets
in this respect, in an .effort to sway Yemeni allegiances.
For example:
Aid to Aden includes some finely
engineered highways, including the Ain-
Mukalla link with its 70 bridges and
600 tunnels, a fishery co-operative
and a farm tool and hardware factory.
Chinese completed staff training for
this plant in December (1978) and
handed it over. ("This factor typifies
the Chinese approach in the Middle East.
They are not making the same mistakes
the Russians are, they tend to go in,
build something, train the technicians
and walk away; the Soviets stick around
and get involved," a Western diplomat
commented.
)
In North Yemen, China is building
the Sanaa-Sada highway and has signed
an agreement on construction of an
international conference center. 27
These efforts are essential components of Chinese regional
strategy, for they have cooled relations with Ethiopia.
They are making overtures to Somalia and stand ready to
aid that nation with industrial development; this coincides
with Somalia's expulsion of Soviet advisors and closure of
Berbera.
The CCP still has a fundamental role in pursuit of
these Middle East objectives by delivering scorching
polemics regarding Soviet adventures. Soviet hegemonism
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and "Third World domination" have been targeted by The
People' s Daily and Red Flag (the CCP theoretical digest)
:
The USSR is rolling up the whole of
Africa from the Atlantic to the Indian
Ocean, revealing its ugly and social
imperialist essence.
. . . By establishing itself there, it
would regain lost prestige and move into
Southern African and the Arabian Peninsula
as well . . . Facts show that the side
that receives Soviet assistance as well
as the side that opposes it are both
victims of social imperialist aggression
and objects of the Soviet Union's
colonial enslavement . . .
Since the assassination in the North and the coup d'etat
in the South (June 1978) , the criticism has increased in
frequency and severity. As the Soviets effectively struck a
blow at Maoism when Ali was executed, (a victory of Soviet
over Chinese socialism) , the attacks in the media did not
begin immediately after his death, rather proceeded with a
graduated response, carrying the stories of Soviet complicity
29from other nations' presses.
As to the future shape of Chinese policy in the Yemens,
one may only speculate based on recent developments. The
coup in PDRY resulting in increased Soviet entrenchment, and
the Iranian revolution (specifically the ouster of their
former ally, the Shah) have been humiliating events for the
PRC. China and Pakistan share certain security interests
and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has posed a potential
threat to these. In order to counter that threat, the PRC
Foreign Minister, Hung Hua, paid a visit to Pakistan
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discussing security assistance (and probably the re-transfer
of military equipment to Muslim partisans in Afghanistan)
.
Additionally, the normalization of Sino-American relations
and the mounting concern over the apparent Soviet containment
attempts would indicate that China may increase her dealings
with the YAR. A mutual defense, or any other Sino-Yemeni
military agreement remains at this point, a function of the
PRC logistic and resupply capability. Accordingly, the two
Yemens will remain barometers that reflect indirectly, but




V. THE US AND THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC
The time is going to come when we need to do
some fundamental rethining about arming every-
body in the world and to this extent, particu-
larly in a region like that (the Arabian Penin-
sula) .
We talk about justifying it in terms of our
security needs. For a long time, we thought we
were talking about Iran's security needs with all
the weaponry and things we put into that country.
—Rep. Gerry E. Studds
(to House Subcommittee on
Europe and the Middle East;
96th Congress, first session:
hearing on aid request to
YAR)
A. BACKGROUND
In the years since World War II, the United States policy
towards the Middle East in general and the Arabian Peninsula
in particular has been characterized by a desire to bolster
the existing traditional governments there. By assuring a
stable set of political relationships, US interests—primarily
an uniterrupted oil supply—would best be protected. Often,
this policy has required that Soviet presence and advances
be countered. The rationale for this American policy can
be found in spirit, if not always in the letter, of the 195 7
Eisenhower Doctrine. This doctrine, an integral component
of the Cold War and an extension of the Truman-Kennan contain-
ment theory, proved to be reactive and geared towards a
series of crisis-management responses to the dynamic events
in this region. Although a precursor to the Nixon and "Carter"
Doctrines (1969 and 1980 respectively) , the general tone is
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one of stability in light of local events potentially jeopar-
dizing US vital interests.
In the Middle East there is a confluence of US as well
as Soviet interests; the process of protecting these has
produced contention:
Rivalry and competition between the US and the
USSR are the consequences of three factors:
(1) they are superpowers in a world which has
no others; (2) they have fundamental differences
in ideology; and (3) they share the belief that
a significant gain for one (in military power,
control of territory or expanded influence)
constitutes a corresponding loss and a danger
for the other. Geography and oil make it
almost inevitable that (they) will pursue active
and competing policies in this region.
There are two points which account for a sharp differ-
entiation between US and Soviet policies: a) the apparent
methodical, long-range, calculated, global goals of Soviet
power projection as contrasted to those of the US which
change regularly on a four-year cycle; and b) the inertial
effects of a Soviet military (especially the naval) bureaucracy
in motion working to achieve a desired end.
In this context, attention must be paid to emerging
Soviet perceptions regarding the possibility of a Western
reaction to their involvement in the area. The seriousness
with which the Russians take certain press accounts relating
to mounting US concern about their role and Western needs to
challenge it is difficult to gauge. One may speculate that
they are seriously concerned, and if this is correct, it
follows that Moscow (though desirous of filling power vacuums
or posing as the defender of "progressive forces" in the
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area) remains worried about escalations which threaten con-
frontations with the US. Rather than attempting to counter
each Soviet foray with a counter-demonstration. . .
. . . (Nevertheless) in as critical an area as
this one, at least as perceived by both sides,
it would be useful to decompress the tension by
as clear cut a delimitation of military presence,
without at the same time destabilizing the
local situation to our disadvantage, is, of
course, the perennial challenge for (US) policy-
makers.
The principle means of carrying out this mission has
been through cultivating relations with Saudi Arabia and
Iran, "the two-pillar policy." However, certain events have
necessitated a reordering of priorities in this corner of
the globe and a change in the direction and approach of
American foreign policy. The Iranian revolution, the subse-
quent Shockwaves of Islamic revival, the February-March 19 79
border war between the YAR and the PDRY, and the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan emphasize the need for this change.
B. THE SANAA-RIYAHD-WASHINGTON TRIAD
The delicate relationship between the Sanaa government,
the Saudi monarchy and the United States is growing every
more inter-dependent, as the national interests of each are
challenged by the Soviet Union and their proxy force, the
South Yemenis. A tactical (and in some instances a more
formal) alliance is required if these three actors are to
conduct a concerted response to this challenge. This unstable
tri-lateral relationship is dependent on the preservation of
the security interests of each. For the YAR and Saudi Arabia,
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territorial and internal security is at stake, while for the
United States, there are definite foreign policy objectives
(i.e., specific regional goals) to be achieved. The con-
cerns of each of these actors will be identified here.
Conceptually, one may view this relationship as a tri-
angle with each leg representing a country; a security tri-
angle, of sorts. Forming the bond which holds the nations
together is a combination of labor (Yemeni-Saudi) , security
assistance (US-Saudi- Yemeni) and petroleum (Saudi-US) ; a
more nebulous security bond links the YAR and the US.
1. Sanaa. The Yemen Arab Republic is indeed in a state of
transition, as apparent from the account of political events.
A major goal of the government through (its
developmental) programs is to increase the
sense of nationalism among Yemenis, with the
resultant loyalty to the central government.
Yemenis possess a strong sense of identity, but
this identity is still closely tied to tribal,
village, regional, or religious affiliations.
The concept of national identity could transcend
these other loyalties, but the lack of stability
in the central government and the perceived weak-
ness of the government, even in matters of
security, not only hinders national cohesive-
ness, but private and foreign investment as
well. 5
It has been said that were the Yemn to achieve true
internal security this cohesiveness would offset any external
threat, particularly from South Yemen. The YAR is determined
to achieve this security: it is imperative that Yemen become
strong and build up its internal structure, not only politi-
cally, but militarily (regardless of the source; the line of
thinking is that the ultimate goal of national security will
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be strong enough to resist any "political strings" attached
to the aid provided) . This goal is applicable to all states
of the Arabian Peninsula, the emirates, sheikhdoms, etc.
2. Riyadh. Since the time of Abd al-Aziz al Saud (Ibn
Saud) the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's first monarch, the Royal
family ruled consistently and unchallenged, with peaceful
succession remaining "in house." King Faisal ruled Saudi
Arabia until his assasssination by a nephew in 1975. He
guided the nation through the momentous few years of the
country's growth, especially in the two years after the
October 19 73 war, which led to major price increases in Saudi
7(and other Arab states') oil. He was instrumental in swaying
the allegiances of the republican regime in Sanaa away from
the USSR and towards the West. A similar campaign was
attempted in PDRY, but was unsuccessful. What emerged from
this period and remains so today is a here-to-fore incompre-
hensible "international power and stature."
King Faisal's successors, King Khalid and Crown Prince
Fahd continued the policy of modernization begun by Faisal,
but they expanded the task and began preparing an activist,
g
conservative foreign policy on a scale not considered before.
The basis for this foreign policy is a Saudi hegemony of
sorts that will ensure the aims of the Royal family— the
unquestioned national goals—are met. In concrete terms,
this means maintenance of the balance of power in the region,
especially resisting the Soviet incursions in the PDRY, the
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Horn of Africa, and on the Iraqi border. Although, for the
YAR, these closer ties are resented somewhat as an impediment
9to Yemen's freedom of action. Saudi Arabia, naturally, is
also very concerned with this situation and, not wanting to
see a radical regime on her Southern borders, has strengthened
her ties and military aid to Yemen. The Saudis wish to
ameliorate this situation, perhaps for fear of a threat to
their monarchy.
The question has been asked if Saudi Arabia will feel
the spillover effects of events in Iran and be faced with a
similar revolution, via the Yemens , but the answer is not
exactly clear. To be sure, there are numerous similarities
in the domestic structures, but there are more significant
differences that may indicate resistance to Yemeni, or other
destabilizing efforts. For example, the average Saudi Arabian
receives a greater share of revenues from petro-dollars than
his Iranian contemporary; there are the Islamic religious
differences, Sunni and Shi' a (Saudi Arabia and Iran, respec-
tively); and in Saudi Arabia, the Saud king is approachable
to any member of society— a striking difference to the Pahlavi
dynasty. Conversely, statistics show that there is a growing
middle class emerging and this frustrated class consciousness
could prove fruitful for revolutionary reform. In fact,
"when and if a revolution comes, it will probably not be one
under the aegis of Islam—which makes it all the more proba-
ble that a Marxist tone will predominate. . . It is quite
conceivable that when violent change comes about, it will
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take place at a moment when the frustrations of the Bedouin
population have progressed to such a point that the Bedouin
army will be prepared to make common cause with the regulars."
There has been a good deal of speculation of late as to
what the ultimate direction of Saudi foreign policy will
take; this is inseparably linked to the question of succession.
Foreign Minister Saud would no doubt prefer to pursue a policy
of close cooperation with all Arab states, and he can justi-
fiably maintain that even the Kingdom's Arab opponents would
be willing to engage in such a policy of official "friendship."
(That Saud places a premium on ' intra-Arab conflict resolu-
tion* may be borne out through the results of the March 1979
12Yemen crisis.) However, there have also been murmurings on
a large scale of dissension within the Royal family, ranging
from questions of Prince Fahd's succession as Crown Prince
to how to support the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty. The nuances
of the Saudi dissensions and disagreements are many, some less
subtle than others. Basically, the older generation of Abdul-
Aziz's sons is inclined to rely on the old, and in some
respects proven alliance with the United States, based on
some mutual confidence rather than any written documents.
But today, confidence in the Americans is somewhat shaken.
The fall of the US ally, the Shah of Iran and the 1979 Egyptian-
Israeli peace treaty diminish this conifdence. The Saudi
leaders, however, feel that giving their blanket approval to
this effort would be the "start of suicide, exposing themselves
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to the broadsides of Arab nationalist propaganda." (The
more mistrustful of them ask: Is this the beginning of
13Washington's attempt to destabilize our dynasty?) For
instance, just after the Shah's exit from Teheran, the US
14
sent a squadron of unarmed F-15's to Saudi Arabia. This
demonstration was so wrought with international bureaucratic
requirements (e.g.: airspace clearances, fueling stops,
etc.) that it proved to be more of an exercise in frustration
rather than accomplishing its purpose as a viable show of
force. Displays such as these do not exactly enhance the US
image as a superpower
.
Despite these difficulties and the subsequent Saudi
feelings of isolation, "the reigning sons of Abdul-Aziz will
probably continue to work with the US in security policy,
avoid direct attacks against Washington's peace efforts, and
exert a certain moderating influence on OPEC's oil pricing.
How long this informal collaboration will continue will
depend in part on American tact;" and in part on the outcome
of the 19 80 Presidential election. Maintenance of Penin-
sular security and regional stability, primary US foreign
policy objectives, may be accomplished with the help of the
Saudis, provided US demands are not overpowering and that the
"special relationship" with Riyadh is nurtured.
Finally, the Saudis and Yemenis are partners in a labor-
oriented reciprocity; Saudi Arabia has embarked on a develop-
mental program in need of a large number of workers. This
is due to the fact that Saudi Arabia is enjoying a booming
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affluence and many Saudis decline menial, or semi-skilled
work: the YAR is the closest and most adaptable source of
16labor supply. The YAR is clearly benefitting from this
Saudi affluence as no less than one-million (estimates range
from five-hundred-thousand to two-million) Yemeni workers are
engaged in projects in Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.
Estimated worker repatriation of funds for 19 77 exceeded
17$1.5 billion. This influx was desperately needed by the
Yemen, in undertaking its own developmental projects. (This
reciprocity will surface again in unification considerations.)
3. Washington. There are a number of concerns which per-
vade the US-Yemeni relationship; these are listed in priority
importance here:
(a) Despite major US commitments to the continued
existence of the YAR as a strong, independent
state, most Yemenis are concerned about US priori-
ties in the area, the strength of US commitments
after Iran, and reactions to US peace efforts in
the Middle East;
(b) The Government of Yemen must have foreign
experts and programs to meet the goals it has set
for the country's economic development. Yemen
receives considerable aid each year from a number of
countries, including the US, plus remittances from
Yemenis working abroad. Americans are presently
considered by most Yemenis as having the best exper-
tise to assist them in their development, but we
are in continuing competition with Bloc and oil-rich
nations to maintain this position of influence;
(c) Many Yemenis have great misconceptions con-
cering US society, its traditions and values, and
some even consider it the antithesis of traditional
Islamic practices, depite their admiration for
US technology and education;
(d) Even in the highest level of government, US
political processes are not understood, particularly
the role of the media in US foreign policy.
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In a comparative sense the US forte is in diplomacy and
scientific and technological exchange. Efforts here can
succeed where Soviet and East European missions have failed.
A potential strain in relations between the US and the YAR
(based on Yemeni demands) , may emerge should the US be per-
ceived as "less than forthcoming" in these areas. Military
and developmental assistance is the key to US policy formula-
tion; all other issues, both regional and bilateral, which
19
affect the Yemeni-American dialogue are peripheral.
C. THE ARMS TRANSFER AFFILIATION
"Overall, our policy towards North Yemen reflects our
concern for the security and the integrity of the Arabian
Peninsula and our desire to encourage cooperation among mod-
erate Peninsula states, to assure security and orderly develop-
ment of the region, and to develop a strong bi-lateral rapport
20
with the YAR. " It has been this "orderly development"
tactic which has translated into encouraging economic develop-
ment and advancing Yemeni social progress; together these
form the first tier of US-Yemeni relations. Building on this
theme, US economic aid to Yemen would ideally spark similar
assistance from Yemen's neighbor. This in fact has been the
case, for since 1972, the US has furnished in excess of $75
million in developmental assistance, while Saudi Arabia and
21
other nations have supplied over $1 billion to the YAR. After
a rather lengthy involvement with the USSR, the Yemeni recep-
tivity towards an improved stance vis-a-vis the West and Saudi
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Arabia was a dramatic—and rewarding
—
policy shift; (e.g.:
On 6 August, 1975, King Khalid made a gift of 810 million
Saudi riyals, approximately 110 million British pounds, to
North Yemen's budget and development projects paralleing
Washington's decision to sell the YAR weapons and provide
22training.
)
The second tier of the US policy has been concerned with
fulfilling Yemeni security needs; the tempo of military aid
being a function of the threat perception from the South
(i.e., Soviet arms transfers to PDRY) . The present military
program is tri-lateral: Yemeni-Saudi-American, although
23the Yemenis would like direct bilateral relations. The
fact that the Saudis are such key actors in this arrangement
is merely reflective of the broader perspective of the US
arms transfer policy.
The US, in 1976, agreed to its first sale of
military equipment to North Yemen— some $140 mil-
lion in essential infantry equipment, financed by
Saudi Arabia--and began training members of the
Yemen armed forces under our International Mili-
tary Education and Training Program (IMET). . .
In the spring of 1978, the US agreed to a Saudi
transfer of 4 F-5B trainer aircraft to North
Yemen in anticipation of developing an F-5
squadron as the YAR air force.
Table 8 is a list of all US equipment transferred to
the Yemen Arab Republic; note the timing and actions in the
PDRY; a graphic representation of the interaction between
US foreign policy objectives (with a Saudi Royal Family




LIST OF EQUIPMENT TRANSFERRED TO THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC
Itgn
81 81 irm mortars




74 Vulcan air defense
guns
Vulcan ammunition
64 105mm towed howtzers,
105mm ammunition
200 M79 grenade launch,
and ammunition
50 M113A1 APC's
50 APC (x-fered from SAG
2 BAK-12 runway barriers
24 Dragon trackers and
1524 missiles
Air munitions for 12 F-5E
(including ordnance)










































































Jordanian Vulcan trng team
Jordanian M113/M60 trng team
106mm rifles (SAG-YARG)
12 155mm towed hotzers.
Comment
Pres. waiver; 4 a/c
in Sanaa
Cong. not. '77; trng.















*Source: Statement of Hon. L.VJ. Benson, to House Subcomm.
on Appropriations, 96th Congress, First Session,
3 May 1979, pp. 688-690.
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120

There are, naturally, complicating factors to the US-
YAR hardware equation, which stem from historical precepts.
Those directly affecting this policy appear below.
There is a good deal of Soviet equipment in North Yemen's
inventory; maintaining, advising/ and training duties are
carried out by Russian advisors. There are still an esti-
mated 150 Soviet advisors remaining in-country, performing
25these functions; they presumable are performing collateral
duties such as intelligence gathering and corresponding with
the Soviet MAAG in Aden, or the naval facility there.
"In September, 19 79, the YAR received a new shipment of
Soviet-delivered equipment. Included in the delivery were
tons of rockets and ammunition;" meanwhile, other sources
identified a North Yemen deal for 100 Polish-built T-55
2 fi
tanks." The problems of such a renewed Yemeni security
dialogue with the Soviet Union (although in keeping with
YAR's development strategy) vis-a-vis US policy are implicit.
Recent reports, though, assert that as a result of Prime
Minster-level Washington talks, a tentative agreement has
been reached with North Yemen which could limit, or at
least slow the growing Soviet influence there; effecting a
transition from Soviet/E. bloc military equipment. ("Yemen
27has agreed to leave their new Russian toys in the crates.")
(Not that the YAR is a fruitful market for US armaments,
by any means, but . . . ) There is a definite absorption factor
that prohibits the proliferation of sophisticated weapons
systems. In this respect, there is a demonstrated limit to
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to the degree of assimilation in North Yemen by the delivery
2 8
of F-5's; pilots had to be recruited from Taiwan.
Finally, a Saudi ambivalence exists which tends to limit
the growth of the Yemeni armed forces. The Royal Family
would like to see Yemen remain a buffer state; they are
particularly cautious concerning any arms deliveries. The
Yemeni development theme is a point of contention for the
Saudis. Indeed a strong Yemen (i.e., strong enough to defend
itself against aggression or ward off incursions) , is in the
Yemeni and Saudi interest. Conversely, a YAR that is too
strong—one that possesses capabilities beyond these shared
interests— is clearly not in keeping with Saudi foreign policy.
In fact, there have been specualations (throughout the recent
crisis especially) that the Royal family has controlled the
influx of military equipment to North Yemen, been less than
punctual in paying for US equipment transferred there, and
29has generally limited its defense aspirations.
As to the future of the US affiliation, based on these
(and certainly other) considerations and hidden variables,
unless another crisis ensures which would require US security
assistance, there will probably not be another large US
delivery in the near term. (It was particularly disconcertir.g
in Washington to provide the YAR with $500+ million in equip-
ment and have them exclaim--in ef fect--"that ' s not all we
wanted," by turning to the Soviets.) Is is appropriate to
examine this commitment under the recent "test of fire":
the 19 79 border war.
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D. THE FEBRUARY-MARCH 19 79 BORDER WAR: US RESPONSE
Although both the YAR and the PDRY have each blamed the
other for inititating the conflict, it is clear that South
Yemen had a military superiority (see Table ) . The hos-
tilities began on 23 February, 1979 and proved to be more
serious than those skirmishes of the past: "it was a care-
fully planned, coordinated, and amply supported campaign
with apparent intent of seizing and occupying North Yemen
territory and destabilizing the North Yemen government."
As soon as the fighting began, Aden Radio claimed to be
making rapid territorial gains in the North, with the support
of the local population and troops who had deserted from the
North Yemeni armed forces. . . (and) Sanaa RAdio said that
South Yemen had begun shelling Qaataba and Moryes on 20
February in preparation for an infantry attack which had
begun on 23 February backed by MiG-21's, Soviet-built T-55
and T-62 tanks and 160 mm. field guns. Several border towns
32had been destroyed in the fighting according to Sanaa reports.
One curious aspect of the war was that both armies had Soviet
military advisors; their presence helped to undermine the
YAR armed forces' efforts and arrange a PDRY victory. The
US moved quickly to assist the YAR with this series of responses:
1) Increased the intensity of diplomatic efforts
with the Saudis and North Yemenis to assure a
peaceful "intra-Arab resolution" to the conflict;
North Yemen informed the Secretary General of the
United Nations of the attack indicating it was the
object of aggression and was acting in legitimate
self-defense under Article 51 of the UN charter.
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2) State Department spokesman Hodding Carter re-
leased this message to news correspondents: "In
response to requests by the YAR government, we will
accelerate the delivery of arms previously agreed
for that country. We support the Saudi Arabian
appeal to end the fighting. It is in the interests
of the international community that hostilities
in the area cease, that occupying forces withdraw,
and that all parties involved support the princi-
ple of nonaggression. "33
3) Expressed concern to the Soviets, urging re-
straint on both parties; stated that the security
of the Arabian Peninsula was among the US vital
interests and that the US was prepared to take
appropriate actions to defend those.
4) Under the provisions of the Arms Control Export
Act, the President certified the emergency which
waived Congressional review of items of equipment
already before Congress (the value of the equipment
to be transferred to YAR fell below limits speci-
fied by this act) . Requests were processed by
Jordan and Saudi Arabia to transfer US-origin
equipment to the YAR.
5) The Saudis were informed of US intention to
deploy a squadron of F-15's and two Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to
Saudi Arabia to bolster the seucrity of Saudi
airspace. (Saudi Arabia placed its 60,000 man armed
forces on alert and planned to move 1,200 troops
from the Lebanon Arab Deterrent Force.)
6) President Carter ordered a carrier task force
headed by the USS CONSTELLATION from the Seventh
Fleet into the Western Indian Ocean to demonstrate
US concern. 34
As is evident from the range of these actions (i.e.,
from application of diplomatic pressure to insertion of a
carrier task force) the Carter administration was in effect
"drawing the line" for the Soviets; explicitly signaling
that their involvement in the Middle East had begun to encroach
on American vital interests and was to be held in check.
In this connection, the two Yemens made up a symbolic
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testing-ground for Soviet versus US resolve. That a
sovereign nation, North Yemen, had been subjected to Soviet-
sponsored aggression provided the ideological (and legal,
due to the Yemeni and Saudi requests) sanction for a US
rejoinder. This was essentially done in two phases: a) by
expediting the delivery of equipment already enroute prior
to the hostilities commencement, and b) the Presidential
waiver under article 36 (b) to speed delivery of armored
35
vehicles and aircraft.
1. "Aircraft Carrier Diplomacy:" Analysis of This
Policy Option
Official Washington reaction to the latest events
on the Arabian Peninsula is original to say the
least. An American aircraft carrier, CONSTELLATION,
and ships accompanying it have been ordered to sail
from the Philippines to the area of the Arabian
Peninsula. According to a Washington announcement,
this move is being taken in concern over clashes
between North and South Yemen. Several days earlier
under the same pretext, the US sent North Yemen
7000 anti-tank missiles and guns. . . The appearance
of armed conflict anywhere in the world must cause
serious concern, but it is unlikely that a peaceful
settlement of the conflict can be prompted by the
demonstration of American military strength.
Such a policy, known as "gunboat diplomacy,"
has long been regarded in the world as a means of
intimidation (as a weapon of influence) . The US
resorted to such tactics during the Indochina con-
flict, during the oil embargo, and during the events
in Iran. 36
On 2 7 December 19 78, the USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64) was
ordered to get underway from Subic Bay Naval Station in the
Philippines. At the time, the ship was undergoing some much
needed maintenance and crew rest while nearing the end of a
six month Western Pacific deployment. The intended destination
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was the Indian Ocean. As international tension built
(Vietnam was conducting military operations in Cambodia, the
PRC was organizing for the Vietnam campaign, the Soviet Navy
had a presence in the South China Sea, and Shah Mohammed Reza
Pahlavi had just left Iran) , the US was being placed in a
position where it needed to assert itself, largely for the
reassurance of its allies. While the task force was enroute
(in the Straits of Malacca) , CONSTELLATION and her escorts
were order to stop; not to proceed further into the Indian
Ocean, rather to return to Subic Bay. "It appeared that the
(Carter) administration was not exactly sure what CONSTELLA-
37TION's role would be near the mouth of the Persian Gulf."
The task force operated in the vicinity of Singapore for
nearly one month before returning to Subic Bay. During this
timeframe, January 19 79, these international tensions increased
significantly (the PRC invaded Vietnam, the Soviet naval
presence grew, and the Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran)
.
On 6 March, 1979, one day before the end of CONSTELLATION'S
scheduled deployment, orders were received for the carrier,
the cruiser STERRETT, the destroyer WADDELL, and the fast
combat stores ship KANSAS CITY, to get underway and proceed
to the Gulf of Aden (the South Yemenis had invaded North
Yemen). Three Atlantic Fleet destroyers, BERRY, PAGE, and
DAVIS arrived to augment the carrier task force, as did the
submarine TUNNY.
If the January voyage of the CONSTELLATION battle group
was altered due to vacilliation and indecision, then these
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executive waverings were less apparent in March. In January,
the administration did not know what it would do if CONSTELLA-
TION arrived in the Persian Gulf; for instance, when one
puts a carrier task force in an area such as this, that
represents a major power play. If American citizens are
slaughtered, for example, the next question is "What will
the US do about it?" There is a force in being, on station,
with the ability to go into a country, or do certain things
to it; policy-makers are then forced to amke a hard core
decision as to what the objectives are. Perhaps the Carter
administration did not want to be placed in that position
in the Persian Gulf. The Gulf of Aden represents a differ-
ent situation with overriding circumstances. The preservation
of Washington's "special relationship" with Saudi Arabia and
the US dependence on Saudi oil represent these concerns.
Saudi Arabia's own stability is inseparably linked with that
of the YAR; in an effort to stave-off any further Saudi sus-
picions that the US would not really commit itself over the
Arabian Peninsula, the Carter administration shored-up the
commitment through the dispatch of CONSTELLATION to the
Indian Ocean, through sending AWACS and F-15's to the Saudis,
and effecting other arms transfers to North Yemen (directly,
and through re-transfers from Jordan and Saudi Arabia)
.
In regard to contingencies, it was not precisely clear
what CONSTELLATION'S task was. The carrier's commanding
officer, CAPT P.S. McCarthey, USN provided these two plausible
reasons: a) this area was one in which few units had
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previously operated, and b) everyone at different levels
(of the decision-making process) was doing the same thing,
38
namely, learning as the crisis progressed. (This lack of
specific direction was aided by the moderating actions of
Iraq; as the carrier task force arrived on station, a temp-
rary cease-fire was arranged through the Arab League with
Iraq working diligently towards this end.) Upon arrival,
CONSTELLATION did conduct reconnaissance flights primarily
to assess the electronic, naval, etc., orders of battle of
the potential adversaries. The Soviet naval presence was
formidable and complicated this problem of "specifics;"
for example, Soviet forces in the area included Kresta II
and Kara cruisers, Kotlin destroyers, Foxtrot submarines
and a number of Bear and May aircraft. There were several
AGI's (intelligence gathering ships) and merchants: the
latter of these units played significant roles in that the
INDRON (acronym for Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron) flagship
was a merchant laden with electronic equipment; roll on/roll
off vessels transported mobile radar tracking vans for use
in the region. Ideally, an engagement with these forces
would be avoided and that if elements of the carrier task
force were drawn into conflict, it would be with indigenous
forces rather than with Soviet units, a much "cleaner"
operation.
As there were no incidents at sea reported between the
US and USSR navies (save for minor "shouldering operations
—
insertion of a Soviet merchant or AGI between units of the
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39task force) the carrier's presence accomplished its
purpose as a highly visible and publicized US image. The
Pentagon reported that there was no intention for US pilots
to "fly in or over North Yemen, or for US personnel sent
there to become involved in combat with South Yemeni forces
.
From one to two-hundred Americans were to operate only in
40the rear areas, not positioned near fighting fronts. The
Soviets were present presumably to aid their clients; judging
from Soviet naval doctrine and surveying their force struc-
ture, they were prepared to conduct SLOC interdiction (sea
denial, or rather "sea control by default") and ASW operations
Conversely, the US carrier task force was poised for pro-
SLOC operations and ready to undertake whatever assignment
provided by Washington. Given the US foreign policy objec-
tives in this crisis, having as capable a force as this one




It is simply not apparent from the available evidence,
to emphatically conclude that the Soviet Union is following
a "grand design" to take over the territories on its Southern
borders in general, or the Middle East in particular. This
same lack of evidence also precludes adopting the notion
that the Soviets are merely following a "happenstance" policy
of exploiting selected targets of opportunity. What is clear
is that the USSR is pursuing a benevolent foreign policy
towards the PDRY, in consonance with its general Third World
campaign, and at the same time, providing security assistance.
This policy is long range, consistent and contains the neces-
sary political, economic, and defense components to be suc-
cessful. There is a connection between these elements,
although admittedly difficult to quantity. The empirical
evidence presented herein does function to shore up the
assertion that there have been instances when the PDRY, in
concert with other actors, has undertaken military operations
designed to ultimately assist the USSR in attainment of its
national interests. Whether this will continue, or is only
tactical is ancillary to Yemeni national interests and
capacity.
The Soviet approach in dealing with their clients is in
contrast to that of the US. Where the USSR's policy is
essentially long range, in that the recruitment efforts have
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taken a number of years and pledged formally, those of the
US are relatively short range, changing on a cyclic basis.
Where the Soviet policy emphasizes placement of large numbers
of advisors/technicians in-country, proliferates arms and
equipment and has seemingly few restrictions on providing
security assistance, the American policy provides for a limited
number of personnel in-country, and constrains the prolifera-
tion of military equipment. Where the Soviets have a "corre-
lation of forces", the US relies on rapid deployment; as
their relationship with PDRY is bilateral, our relationship
with the YAR is at least tri-lateral. These fundamental
foreign policy orientations are markedly different (witness
the matrices in figs. 7 and 9, indicative of resulting differ-
ent capabilities, intentions, and actions) and account for
the subsequent dissimilar manifestations of these policies
vis-a-vis the Yemens (e.g.: when the Soviets attempt to
train a surrogate force, the US responds to aggression by
that force with a naval task force off the coast to "show
the flag"). The divergent US and Soviet Yemen policies pre-
determine their respective stances on the question of unity.
A. PROSPECTS FOR A UNIFIED YEMEN
Relations between the two governments in North
and South Yemen are hardly comparable to typical
relations between two states. Yemen was until
very recently one country for all intents and
purposes. It was only twelve years ago that an
independent state was created in the Southern




Unification of the PDRY and the YAR was the consensus
reached by the Arab League in March, 1979 after the fighting
during the border war ceased. Under these proposed terms, at
least three points must be identified, as they relate to
Yemen in the international system: 1) the effect that such
a merger would have on the Yemen Arab Republic; 2) the South
Yemen-Soviet link; and 3) the Saudi/Western reaction. (The
idea of a unified Yemen is not new, and the current situation
is all too reminiscent of events in 1972 when in the wake of
similar fighting between the two states and under very similar
intra-Arab pressure, an agreement was signed for the unifi-
cation of the two Yemens. At that time, too, joint committees
were set up. . . and to this day have never been officially
2dissolved.
)
An agreement was reached on 30 March, 1979 which called
for the drafting of a constitution as well as meetings be-
tween the respective heads of state, to arrange a timetable
for union, ameliorating any obstacles along the way. Among
the "promising" results of these meetings was an agreement
on the name of the unified nation--"The People's Republic of
Yemen;" its capital in Sanaa. What is curious about this
attempt is that South Yemen appears anxious to unify (rather
to legally annex the YAR) while North Yemen is evidently
pursuing a more cautious path.
1. The Effect On The Yemen Arab Republic
The transition to union between the two states,
dominated by the South Yemenis, could prove to be at the very
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least, difficult, the worst case, a civil war (i.e., Republi-
can, tribal, PDRY) could erupt. The precise form the con-
flict will assume is not easy to measure. The tenuous
legitimacy which President Salleh enjoys now would certainly
be exacerbated under the circumstances of unity. However,
the primary concern in the North is over South Yemeni social-
ism. Although government officials in the YAR recognize the
tactical logic behind "their brothers in the South" choosing
this form, it is not particularly pleasing. In fact, there
is a pervasive hope in the YAR that they will soon abandon
this Marxist-Leninist means of social organization, due pri-
marily to its incompatability with Islam and the long-term
ill-effects of association with the Soviets ("godless Russians")
The fundamental objective in the YAR is internal development;
a union of the two Yemens could possibly play a significant
(but difficult) role in this process for both countries.
There is noticeable optimism about union in the North; this
goal may be attained through emphasis of commonalities and
reconciliation of differences. Islam serves as an important
vehicle to bring this about.
2 . The South Yemeni-Soviet Link
It has not been publicly discerned yet as to what role
the USSR will play in the Yemeni unification efforts, but
there are components present which would indicate potential
benefits for the Soviets if this materialized. One common-
ality between the two nations of which the Soviet Union has
been particularly laudatory is the Yemeni Socialist Party.
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Hailed as an "important result of the country's political
development and formed by the vanguard of the working
people," this party may well play a key role for Soviet
penetration of the North.
One salient feature of the current transforma-
tions in the PDRY is the broad participation of
the masses; playing a decisive factor at a crucial
moment in the country's history. The importance
of the experience of the two-million strong people
of Democratic Yemen transcends the boundaries of
that country: having a positive effect on the
rest of the Arabian Peninsula.
5
The Arab press contains numerous accounts of large-
scale migrations between the YAR and the PDRY. Given the
Yemeni ex-patriate situation, the potential danger lies in
the fact that a "union of the two Yemens would create a bloc
of seven-million people controlled by a Communist South Yemen,
the largest bloc in the Arabian Peninsula. Such a relation-
ship could spell serious social danger for Saudi Arabia."
Considering the fluidity of Communist ideology and the cham-
pioning of the PDRY socialists, successful unification under
a Marxist regime, and the possibility of fulfillment of Soviet
geopolitical goals, this worst-case analysis could prove
destabilizing for the traditional Peninsular balance. The
dangers are not so much due to direct great power interfer-
ence, but the other way around. "If the big powers are too
strong to fight, the small ones are, by their very weak-
nesses, (and) lack of cohesion, likely to be the cause or the
scene of all kinds of "destabilizing" violence, ranging
from delinquency, organized crime, piracy, riots, guerilla
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warfare, and fullscale replays of World War II tank battles
7
and air raids."
The Soviet arms transfer policy may very well prove
to be the catalyst to develop these loosely amalgamated
components into an integrated whole. In fact, the October
1979 shipment of Soviet weapons would indicate a renewed
Soviet emphasis geared to sway the YAR away from the Saudi,
S. African, Israeli "sub- imperialist" stance. By prolifera-
tion of military hardware to these nations, the USSR may be
attempting to bring both Aden and Hodeida into its sights
for possible military use.
3. The Saudi/Western Reaction
Foremost in the minds of policymakers in the Saudi
Royal family and in the West is the potential threat that
such a union of the two Yemens would create. Destabilization
of the Peninsular moderate powers is a very real possibility,
particularly in light of the labor reciprocity. Given the
basic anti-Communist orientation of the Saudi monarchy, a
socialist union would be disconcerting: a serious challenge
issued to Saudi Arabi'a leadership role in intra-Arab affairs.
Hence the Saudi ambivalence to Yemeni development surfaces
once more. Likewise, a socialist bloc (i.e., a unified North
and South) on the Southern border with a comparatively capable
military posture would not be in the Saudi best interest.
As for the United States, in the event of union, a
shift in the regional foreign policy would be required,
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particularly vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia. The Washington-Riyadh
"special relationship" would need to be formalized and more
consistently articulated. Responses to future aggression
would have to be more forceful than 'flag showing. 1 For the
moment, the "tactical" union serves the US intention of con-
flict avoidance; long range policy formulation is much more
intricate. Unification under socialist auspices would strain
any hopes for an improved Yemeni-American dialogue to the
breaking point. "It would be very difficult to have the same
relationship with Sanaa if Yemen was united under a Marxist
„8
regime.
Perhaps the primary threat posed by a Yemen unified
under socialism is the Soviet-client link. Whereas PDRY
has exhibited a willingness to join the Soviets in intra-
extra regional military operations, there is the potential
for the YAR to do likewise under given conditions.
There are countless specific operations the PDRY
security forces (singularly or in conjunction with Cuban/E.
German/Ethiopian contingents) could perform which would
benefit Moscow; some of these have been identified in fig. 1.
By employing the South Yemenis as Soviet proxies, Moscow
could orchestrate regional conflict, produce a devastating
rippling effect, and essentially remain out of a superpower
engagement. Providing PDRY security assistance to other
liberation fronts in the area could effectively temper the
political climate to the Soviet Union's favor (or more cor-
rectly, to Washington's disadvantage), while pursuing its
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vital interests; by manipulating the political actors here,
the entire set of allegiances could be altered completely
through a symbolic commitment (direct Soviet interference
could occur later on). In this respect, there are four
plausible hypotheses which could generate from the present
state.
(1) The PDRY could initiate another border war with
the YAR; due to its questionable legitimacy, the Salleh
regime could collapse and be unable to deter the aggression;
the stage would be set for liberation of the North by the
South and for socialism to be the means of governing the two
states. (Of course, there is the possibility that the same
effects may be achieved through unity other than by conflict.)
Politically mobilized Yemeni-expatriates, alone or in conjunc-
tion with dissidents in other nations (i.e., the moderate
Arab countries), then would become a threatening force.
(2) The spillover effects of the new revolution
might be felt in Oman and a resurgence of the Dhofar Rebellion
may result. Should Sultan Qaboos be ousted and a Marxist-
Leninist coalition assume power, SLOC-interdiction via Hormuz
,
to which Oman has territorial claim, as a means of political
expression may become more likely.
(3) Soviet and Yemeni efforts to create a Red Sea
Basin federation of progressive forces may be increased.
The same spillover effects towards Ethiopia and the Horn of
Africa may be felt which would establish a solid pro-Soviet
bloc there and serve as a Red Sea/Suez SLOC interdiction
staging point and operating area.
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(4) The potential for continued internal destabi-
lizing efforts in Saudi Arabia, coupled with the possibility
of direct military attacks on that kingdom as a result of
Soviet-Yemeni (et al) collusion would be compounded. If
these attempts were successful, the threat to Egypt, Israel,
Jordan, Turkey, etc., is implicit.
Recognizing that these hypotheses are worst case and
would require the support of regional radical groups to supply
the momentum, they are nonetheless possible and probable,
should Soviet supply of the necessary means continue. Fore-
casting or predicting where and when such events may take
place is the inherent difficulty for decision-makers and
intelligence analysts; monitoring Soviet arms transfers and
diplomatic gestures while remaining alert to Yemeni internal
developments will facilitate this task.
As to the challenge to United States policy in the
Red Sea Basin, continued favorable Yemeni (YAR) -Saudi-American
relations are prerequisite. Yet this course must be tangen-
tial to the US Arab-African total policy, addressed in a
consistent manner. Certainly in a crisis such as the March
1979 war, US arms transfers and carrier task force presence
represent an adquate near-term response. However, over the
long run, the policy must fuse security, economic (develop-
mental) and diplomatic (i.e., the moral commitment to demo-
cratic ideals) elements. Response to the Kenyan, Omani, and
Somali invitation to use naval facilities in these countries
represents an ideal premise to inaugurate this policy. In
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fact, the rapproachement between the United States and the
People's Republic of China (given these two nations' foreign
policy objectives) may offer a collateral opportunity. In
the final analysis, the vital national interests that the
US has in this portion of the world are tied to the commit-
ment to the Yemen Arab Republic; similarly, those of the
Soviet Union are linked to the People's Democratic Republic
of Yemen: the respective superpower affiliation with these
actors is a prime determinant of whether their interests
here will be pursued, or restricted.
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NOTE ON ISLAMIC CONCEPTS
To facilitate the reader's understanding of the












"Religious leader." According to Sunnite
beliefs, an imam leads Muslims in congregational
prayers. According to the Shi' ites, he is both
the religious and political leader of the
Islamic community.*
The Age of Ignorance; refers to pre-Islamic
times; the birth of Islam set an end to this
period.
. . . al-asghar: the lesser holy war, i.e.,
the external holy war against infidels;
. . . al-akbar: the greater holy war, i.e.,
the inward holy war against passion and ignorance
Jihad is incumbent upon Muslims as a pillar of
faith.*
Refers to a messianic figure, or one claiming
this stature; (Arabic mahdiy : he who is
guided aright)
.
A major sect in Islam which contends that Ali
(Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law) was the
rightful successor of the Prophet and therefore
his descendants should have been leaders of the
Islamic states.*
"Traditionalists." They represent the orthodox
Muslim population which did not align itself
with any particular sect. Founded on Sunna , or
the traditions of the Prophet.*
A council or college of learned officials
including priests, judges, scholars; they are
trained in religion and offer interpretations
of the Quran.
*Source: Bishai, W. , Islamic History of the Middle East





Naval and merchant marine activity is not only a
primary instrument of Soviet foreign policy, but also
provides a reading with political utility. There is a
certain correlation between shipdays/port visits and
political rapport, as evident here.
SOVIET, BLOC AND CUBAN INDIAN OCEAN
MERCHANT SHIP PORT CALLS
1977-1979
COUNTRY JAN-MAR APR-JUN JUL-SEP OCT-DEC TOT
Djibouti
1977 5 8 2 4 19
1978 5 8 7 12 32
19 79 12 6 12 12 42
Ethiopia
1977 15 16 29 30 90
1978 57 21 26 15 119
1979 21 18 21 26 86
North Yemen
1977 62 73 75 66 276
1978 84 54 56 43 237
1979 79 67 69 75 290
Somalia
1977 28 27 25 14 94
1978 2 3 3 8
1979 3 4 2 1 10
South Yemen
1977 6 13 7 7 33
1978 4 10 5 3 23
1979 14 16 13 10 53


























































































































SOVIET INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL/NAVAL ASSOCIATED PORT VISITS
1977-1979*







1978 17 34 20 16




19 79 1 3
Somalia




1977 3 6 12 23
1978 31 27 23 19
1979 15 25 12 15











* The port visit figures listed here represent the number of
Soviet Units present in each country during the quarter
noted, including permanent/semi-permanent presence.
All port call figures listed herein are based only on
information reported to the NAVAL OCEAN SURVEILLANCE
INFORMATION CENTER and processed by the Sea Watch System.
Source: Director, Naval Ocean Surveillance Information
Center, letter to Superintendent, NAVPGSCOL,
7 February, 19 80: Ship Activity Support to
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